Manifesto for a New Fiction

Sol Luckman

The problem with much contemporary Americansome would say, worldfiction is twofold. If we understand many commercial novels these days to fall somewhere on the spectrum between literary and visionary, with much in the middle that scarcely deserves mentioning, its hard to ignore the fact were living a classic Catch-22. Literary novels are just not that visionary, which is another way of saying theyre often boring and unimaginative, slaves to a dogged realismwhereas visionary novels are, typically, none too literary, which is another way of saying often poorly, if not execrably, written, cobbled together with their narrative machinery clanking and clunking.

Historically, the exceptions confirm the rule. Tolkiens THE HOBBIT and THE LORD OF THE RINGS are indeed consummately both literary and visionary. These classics have also been imitated so many timesunsuccessfully, even laughablyit beggars belief. Here and there a contemporary novel pops up on the radar in this magical Twilight Zone where craft and invention seem indissolubly weddedRobert Coovers THE PUBLIC BURNING comes to mindbut those of us literary-visionary hybrids who scour todays fictional landscape in search of inspiration usually come up empty.

The fly in the ointment is that old bugger, realism. Nearly two centuries after Stendhals novel-as-mirror traveled the tedious highway of fiction, and despite the influences of modernism and postmodernism, the majority of todays novel readers, like Coca-Cola addicts, still want the Real Thing. I'm speaking metaphorically, of course. The beauty of a metaphor is it doesnt have to be real to ring true. The instant a metaphor becomes real it ceases to be a metaphor, which suggests a disconnect between truth and whats commonly referred to as reality. This is a pivotal pointthat the real world probably isnt what you believe it is, or rather, that it s precisely what you believe it iswhich, if you still dont get it, I can only trust someday you will.

I dont mean any of this theoretically. Theory does everything in its power to remove the living soul of literature, tear its heart out, make of the study of Art a hard-edged Science. Never mind that Art is as far removed from measurement as Science is from love. As writers confronting theory, its incumbent on us not to let our prose dry up in that desert, but to allow it to become a desert rose, our prose, flourishing in the heat and sands of what passes for knowledge.

We must, then, for them to be of any worth whatsoever, live our theories practically. For writers this means, inevitably, doing the deednot just having the idea but putting it on paper, writing down not just the bones of our dreams but their flesh and blood as well. Literature, at its best, and despite the recent attempts of critics, can never be murdered and dissected, as its an immortal yet organic thing, drawing on the richness and complexity of Experience yet somehow managing to transcend its mundane origins like an alchemist transmuting base metals. The current twin foci on theory and realism conspire to dry up the spirit and wither the soul, blind the eye and deafen the ear, broil the brain and microwave the heartand perhaps most disturbingly for us radical wordsmiths who still havent sold out to the Man, brown the nose and pucker the rectum.

If were to avoid becoming fiction robots in a corporate world, we must stop adding to our educational excesses, eschew the assembly line of MFAs and bottom-line publishing houses, commit ourselves to a way of writing that engages in a valiant struggle to push the limits of plot and language so as to awaken, not anaesthetize, the reader. Anything rather than live in the dead world of those cold people, the Intellectuals. Anything rather than subject ourselves to the fusty chain of academic command, the savage petty politics where the arguments are so heated because the stakes, as someone once astutely quipped, are so small.

We must lay our ears back and push on into the literary fourth dimension, realm of feminine chaos and infinite possibility, forego regionalism and play with farceand, especially, always appreciate the bizarre. Love for the bizarre is, itself, transformational. When you welcome the bizarre into the fiction of your life, anything and anybody can be transformed from dogshit into gold.

Lets begin a new literary movement. I dont care what we call it. Lets start writing novels for people who dont like novels. Because these days who can blame them? You can please all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cant please all the people all the time. So lets at least please ourselves. Years from now when verisimilitude is finally understood as a terribly limiting proposition, let our daringly experimental books (often self-published, often ignored by the mainstream) be remembered as the Rubicon fiction crossed on its journey into multidimensionality. There can be no turning back, for readers or writers, after our historical strokes of madcap genius. Or so my story goes.

Once in every generation, if were lucky, a character shows up who can teach us about reality because hes more real than ourselves. Melville called such a character a Drummond light after the type of light once used in theaters that was capable of providing illumination in many directions. May one of us create such a character. Better yet, lets buck tradition and create a string of Drummond lights, each a brilliant facet of the Hope Diamond that is our new fiction. Lets turn away, once and for all, from old Enlightenment tropes toward a new narrative of Enwritenment. Together lets write light.

In so doing, maybe, over time, our inherited and mostly dysfunctional posterity urge based on ego will gradually give way to something more stable, healthier, that might be called simply the urge to be. To have been versus to be. Product versus process. In the face of a literature of monoliths and petroglyphs, we have the choice to opt for incompletion. May our new writing shine with the protean power of now. May imagination become the new faith.

Copyright (c) 2011 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

Booze, Smokes & American Cultural Identity

Sol Luckman 

The stereotypical image of “the writer” is familiar to anyone familiar with Hollywood. The camera pans up to the fifth floor of a run-down building, into a room overlooking the street, then comes to rest on a desk in the corner. On the desk are the artiste’s essentials: a typewriter, a half-empty bottle of whiskey, and an ashtray overflowing with cigarette butts. The writer need not even be present: we have been taught to recognize his traces as surely as we read the proverbial writing on the wall.

Not that alcohol and cigarettes are somehow private property of an American cultural elite. In France, for example, this literary combination took root early as well and has remained alive—thanks to Hollywood and its imitators and the star power of locals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus—down to the present day. Nevertheless, I propose that booze and smokes as necessary tools for the writer’s craft represent a particularly American myth—and also one of America’s most successful and enduring cultural exports.

It is curious indeed to move from American literature of the Nineteenth Century into that of the Twentieth. From the rare figures of an Edgar Allan Poe supposedly writing himself into a drunken stupor, or a Herman Melville hard at work with brandy and a good pipe, we suddenly find ourselves in a world of smoky jazz bars and hard liquor flowing out of speakeasy pipes—in short, the celluloid world of F. Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald.

Where did this made-for-the-big-screen universe suddenly come from? This is a complex question with complex answers, of which I can but suggest a few here. An in-depth analysis of this question would have to consider issues as diverse as the persistence of drugs such as opium in literature through the mid-Nineteenth Century, their relative eclipse, and the rebirth of literary drug culture after World War II; the increasing focus on poetic madness among artists of the generations who came of age after the Twenties; the role of music, be it jazz or rock & roll, as code for sex, which was often another way of saying freedom; etc.

Disclaimers aside, let us briefly trace the parallel careers of alcohol and cigarettes in literature separately, before more closely examining their abrupt crystallization in American cultural production early in the Twentieth Century.

One need look no further than the figure of Dionysus to locate the origin, in Western thought at least, of the association of artistic creation with alcohol consumption. Initially the god of wine and sexual fertility, Dionysus was later promoted to patron of the arts who could endow his worshippers with divine creativity.

The thus “inspired” artist became a commonplace in the Romantic era, as writers and revolutionaries alike (often one and the same) looked back to Greek and especially Roman models for their own inspiration. The image of the writer that emerged out of this retrospective was a contradiction. At once clearsighted and intoxicated, prophet and fool, poet and rebel, he would come to be known by many names—Lord Byron, Charles Baudelaire, Arthur Rimbaud, William Faulkner, Jack Kerouac, Lenny Bruce, Jim Morrison.

The literary career of cigarettes is a comparatively more modern—and arguably, more American—affair. Cigarette smoking actually originated in the West Indies and parts of Central and South America, before being exported to Europe by Spanish explorers in the late 1500s. Until the Twentieth Century, however, the cigarette remained largely foreign to literary appropriation, appearing famously in the biography of Walter Raleigh, but elsewhere toiling in obscurity.

The failure of cigarettes to enter the world of belles lettres was undoubtedly related to the difficulty of producing them en masse, which was only to be resolved around 1875 with the introduction of cigarette manufactories in England and America. There was also the problem of image competition—particularly in England—from pipe smokers such as Charles Dickens and Conan Doyle, whose genteel descendants in the past century boasted the likes of J.R.R. Tolkien and naturalized Englishman T.S. Eliot.

An early indication of the new American aesthetic which would combine alcohol and cigarettes may be found in Henry James’s anthologized novel, THE AMBASSADORS. Conceived in 1895 and published in serial form in 1903, THE AMBASSADORS participates vigorously in the Jamesian project of defining America against the backdrop of a wiser, more civilized Europe. The novel’s protagonist, Lambert Strether, travels to France on an “American” mission to recall his patroness’s wayward son Chad from a supposedly corrupt life in Paris, but what Strether learns over the course of his mission profoundly alters his perceptions not only of himself but of the America he purports to represent.

In effect, James pits two very different Americas against each other: the traditional America of puritanical and mercantile values (symbolized by Mrs. Newsome, Mrs. Pocock and Waymarsh) against an emerging America infused with a new, freer spirit through its contact with Europe (symbolized by Chad, Little Bilham, and Strether himself). This positing of two antipathetic countries within a single one suggests a number of oppositions which the novel sketches in varying degrees of completeness, including: a rigid moral code versus a purely aesthetic one, and an outmoded literature versus a developing one which will incorporate this new “moral” aesthetic.

James thereby serves as American prophet and role model for what Malcolm Cowley will condemn as the “religion of art” in EXILE’S RETURN. Gertrude Stein, among others, credited James with thus ushering in the aesthetic formalism of the Twentieth Century, remarking of herself from the perspective of Alice Toklas, “It is rather strange that she was not then [in her days at Radcliffe] interested in the work of Henry James for whom she now has a very great admiration and whom she considers quite definitely as her forerunner, he being the only nineteenth century writer who being an american felt the method of the twentieth century.”

Ralph Waldo Emerson once remarked of himself and his fellow countrymen, “We go to Europe to be Americanized.” It is perhaps no accident that in THE AMBASSADORS the straight-laced Strether, while delving into what it means to be an American, takes up cigarette smoking. At the same time he gives himself over increasingly to what might be called recreational drinking, particularly during his lunches with Madame de Vionnet.

In one sense, of course, Strether is merely “letting his hair down.” But on a deeper level he would appear to be constructing a new identity for himself, a new American identity, a hybrid of the Old World and the New, one modeled on the seemingly unconscious grace of the poet Little Bilham. Indeed, Strether appears consciously to imitate Little Bilham, both in the latter’s attitude of expatriate flâneur and in his habit of smoking cigarettes (which characteristics, for that matter, seem inseparable). Insofar as the older Strether stands in for his author—James himself admitted as much—, this flattering imitation might be read as an approval of the lifestyle and symbols chosen by the up-and-coming generation of artists.

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the combination of alcohol and cigarettes was something new, something truly “American,” full of both pioneer spirit and a kind of carelessness, and young writers seized upon it with all the fervor of youth, and all the excitement occasioned by the dawning of a new century. These symbols constituted at once a rejection of the old America and the making of a new one, a move from provincial puritanism to urbane aestheticism.

In a country thus internally divided between two moralities, what more fitting vices than a depressant and a stimulant combined? And for the once culturally advanced Europe, now suddenly following America’s lead after “America created the twentieth century,” to use Stein’s phrase, what less surprising than that these symbols should become the norm worldwide? Years before the Marlboro Man graced the billboards of foreign cities, our ambassadors were already hard at work writing their novels in Europe, and more would soon join them. Hollywood took care of the rest.

Copyright (c) 2011 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

E. L. Doctorow's THE BOOK OF DANIEL: The Politics of Performance

Sol Luckman

Rosenberg (ro’zin-bûrg’), Julius. 1918-1953. American spy who with his wife, Ethel (1915-1953), was convicted of helping pass information concerning nuclear weaponry to the Soviets. Despite questions concerning the fairness of the trial and international pleas for clemency, the couple was executed. –AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

Over the past half-century since 1953, a virtual cultural industry has grown up around the Rosenberg trial. Biographies and histories have been written. Numerous studies definitively proving the Rosenbergs’ innocence have been published, as have a roughly equal number of studies definitively proving their guilt. Photographs, collages, paintings and installations have been exhibited in prominent museums and galleries around the world. Documentaries and plays have been produced. Recently, Ethel Rosenberg and Roy Cohn, the assistant prosecutor in the Rosenberg trial, appeared as characters in Tony Kushner’s Pulitzer Prize-winning play ANGELS IN AMERICA (1993).

In addition, the Rosenbergs have been mentioned or have made cameo appearances in dozens of novels, at least two of which–E.L. Doctorow’s THE BOOK OF DANIEL and Robert Coover’s THE PUBLIC BURNING–have taken the Rosenbergs as their primary subject matter. These novels have attracted literary critics in droves, generating dozens of full-length studies and literally hundreds of papers and articles. The Rosenbergs have provided a locus for so much dissent and contention in so many areas of cultural production–literary, critical, artistic, theatrical, historiographic, theoretical–that Gore Vidal has been able to offer a credible alternative to the label postmodernism, at least as it applies to the United States, referring to the period that has witnessed the erosion of the explanatory power of metanarratives as the “post-Rosenberg era.”

The citation from the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY represents the Rosenberg agon in miniature. On the one hand, we have the official story: Julius Rosenberg the “American spy” convicted and executed along with his wife for “helping pass information concerning nuclear weaponry to the Soviets.” Exactly what this information was isn’t specified. At the time of the trial, the prosecution strongly suggested (a suggestion picked up by and promulgated through the media) that Julius had given the Soviets the “bomb itself,” although no certified atomic scientists were called to testify to this effect.

Subsequently, scientists have examined the fatal Greenglass “bomb” sketches that convicted the Rosenbergs and found them to be everything from “confused and imprecise” to a “caricature.” General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, was quoted while testifying in 1954 before an AEC special Personnel Security Board hearing that “the data that went out in the case of the Rosenbergs was of minor value. I would never say that publicly. Again, that is something, while it is not secret, I think should be kept very quiet because irrespective of the value of that in the over-all picture, the Rosenbergs deserved to hang.”

Against this official story the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY notes the various “questions concerning the fairness of the trial,” questions which remain alive and troubling to this day. Virginia Carmichael’s analysis of the trial (in FRAMING HISTORY: THE ROSENBERG STORY AND THE COLD WAR) demonstrates that, among other abuses, due process was repeatedly violated; the Rosenbergs were effectively tried and found guilty in the newspapers before a verdict was ever passed; and, most disconcerting of all, by “being charged for conspiracy but rhetorically convicted and sentenced for treason, the Rosenbergs were deprived of the constitutional safeguard of the two-witness rule for treason.”

Another problematic issue hinted at by the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY is the role played by Ethel Rosenberg in the “atomic spy ring” that supposedly gave the Soviets the bomb. Note that the dictionary entry reads, “American spy who with his wife, Ethel (1915-1953), was convicted …” The odd staccato syntax used to describe two individuals known to history collectively as the Rosenbergs obliquely betrays an awareness that Julius was the only one against whom actual charges were brought. From the FBI files released under the Freedom of Information Act, it’s now recognized there was virtually no evidence against Ethel Rosenberg. Carmichael describes how she was, in essence, illegally used by the FBI as a “lever” to make Julius confess and implicate others in what was touted by J. Edgar Hoover to be an immense international communist spy ring.

The power of the Rosenberg case to compel and fascinate hinges on its ambiguity. In an oft-cited essay entitled “False Documents,” Doctorow has written, “Consider those occasions–criminal trials in courts of law–when society arranges with all its investigative apparatus to apprehend factual reality. Using the tested rules of evidence and the accrued wisdom of our system of laws we determine the guilt or innocence of defendants and come to judgment. Yet the most important trials in our history, those which reverberate in our lives and have most meaning for our future are those in which the judgment is called into question: Scopes, Sacco and Vanzetti, the Rosenbergs. Facts are buried, exhumed, deposed, contradicted, recanted. There is a decision by the jury and, when the historical and prejudicial context of the decision is examined, a subsequent judgment by history. And the trial shimmers forever with just that perplexing ambiguity of a true novel.”

Indeed, the judgment of history has ranged outright “proof” of the Rosenbergs’ innocence alongside such smugly confident statements as Leslie Fiedler’s assertion that “the legal guilt of the Rosenbergs was clearly established at their trial.” Doctorow’s point is that determining the innocence or guilt of the Rosenbergs is, precisely, no longer the point. This kind of spectacular trial, with its dense historical palimpsest of arguments and counterarguments, justifications and recriminations, “shimmers” emblematic of a reality that is always already a matter of interpretation.

The notion of an extralinguistic reality, of a world of preconstituted facts that could be apprehended, weighed, measured and graphed, is an empiricist illusion. In Doctorow’s words, “there is no fiction or nonfiction as we commonly understand the distinction: there is only narrative.” Such a statement can be considered a postmodern manifesto, and indeed, “False Documents” has been read as just that. Although early in his career Doctorow balked at being labeled a postmodernist, as I’m defining the term he represents the postmodern writer par excéllence.

One of the ironies of a retrospective judgment like Fiedler’s is that, for all his assurance of the Rosenbergs’ guilt, he can’t resist “reading” them as characters in a historical drama. Perhaps this is because he’s a literary critic by trade, but I rather believe his gesture responds (intuitively as it were) to the literary quality of history itself–to the way it “shimmers forever with just that perplexing ambiguity of a true novel.” Fiedler argues that there were actually two Rosenberg cases, the “open-and-shut” one in which the couple was convicted as atomic spies, and a second, “legendary” one which transformed the Rosenbergs into “a parody of martyrdom … too absurd to be truly tragic, too grim to be the joke it is always threatening to become.”

And yet Fiedler has trouble keeping the two cases apart. He keeps returning to the first case, to events like Ethel’s final appeal to Eisenhower, which, he writes, “is surely among the most embarrassing [of her letters], combining with Ethel’s customary attempts at a ‘literary’ style, and the constitutional inability to be frank which she shared with her husband, a deliberate and transparent craftiness.”

This is one of numerous aesthetic criticisms Fiedler levels at the Rosenbergs. The impression is that he’s obsessively compelled to convict and re-convict them, not on the basis of any “factual” evidence, but on their literary shortcomings! As Doctorow suggests, the Rosenberg case, like all events subsumed into history, inherently possesses a narrative structure. And it possesses one because, as Hayden White (THE CONTENT OF THE FORM) has repeatedly argued, it can only attain the status of history by assuming such a structure.

This kind of thinking underwrites Carmichael’s study, which overtly reads the case as what Paul Isaacson, Julius Rosenberg’s surrogate in THE BOOK OF DANIEL, calls a “capitalist drama … [a] passion play for our Christian masters.” Carmichael deliberately tells the Rosenberg story in terms of “Plotting,” “Casting,” “Rehearsals” and other “Dramatic Strategies” in order to foreground its histrionic–as opposed to historical–character. “By the time of the executions,” she explains, “the textually elaborated official story had crystallized into the coherent form of a traditional novel or drama with distinct characters, a defined and polarized conflictual plot, a strong and unambiguous linear cause-and-effect development and narrative line, and a rising and falling action bounded by a necessary beginning and the most definitive ending available in history or fiction: death as retribution and redemption.”

With the foregoing discussion in mind, there should be little question as to why Doctorow chose in THE BOOK OF DANIEL to reflect on 1960s radicalism through the kaleidoscopic, shimmering lens of the Rosenberg legacy. Published in 1971, the novel appeared at the apex of public discontent over Vietnam, when skepticism concerning Enlightenment master narratives was at an all-time high, at a time when the Old Left was dead and the New Left was failing.

The moment was ripe for a reconception of the liberal humanist notions of an empirical or “essential” reality, the unified subject, and the possibility of political revolution. As a novelist Doctorow felt free to play with the idea of the Rosenbergs, making several important character substitutions. In his version of the story, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg become Paul and Rochelle Isaacson; Susan, their daughter, replaces one of the Rosenberg sons; and Ethel’s betrayer/brother David Greenglass is transformed into Dr. Selig Mindish, family friend and dentist. While remaining remarkably faithful to the official Rosenberg trial (for the most part merely altering the names of its principal participants), Doctorow assumes considerable poetic license in his treatment of the various traumas, neuroses and pathologies suffered by his fictional characters.

The narrative premise is disarmingly simple: Daniel Lewin (born Isaacson) sits in the stacks of the Columbia University library supposedly writing his doctoral dissertation. What he is actually trying to do, however, is come to terms with his nightmarish past, with a country which executed his parents for acts of espionage they may or may not have committed, and with a sister so shell-shocked by her own childhood that she has recently attempted suicide and is literally wasting away in a mental hospital. An exemplary self-begetting text, the result of Daniel’s “research” is the novel we’re reading, THE BOOK OF DANIEL, by E. L. Doctorow, problematically related to “DANIEL’S BOOK,” facetiously described by its “author” Daniel as “A Life Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctoral Degree in Social Biology, Gross Entomology, Women’s Anatomy, Children’s Cacophony, Arch Demonology, Eschatology, and Thermal Pollution.”

The association of Doctorow and Daniel, author and protagonist, as I hope I’ve suggested, is altogether deliberate. More than one critic has remarked this relationship. Not that Daniel in any simplistic way stands in for Doctorow. Rather, he represents the Artist, or the idea of the Artist, coming to terms with a specific country at a specific moment under specific cultural and historical circumstances: the United States, 1967, during the postmodern or post-Rosenberg era.

A child of the lower class, the son of communist “spies” in the cold war, Daniel, like his biblical namesake, struggles against a legacy of persecution and exile, chasing an elusive identity in a society where he can hardly be said to exist, much less belong. Referring to the dossier the FBI supposedly maintains to keep track of and neutralize him, Daniel observes, “I live in constant and degrading relationship to the society that has destroyed my mother and father … I am deprived of the chance of resisting my government … No matter what political or symbolic act I perform in protest or disobedience, no harm will befall me … I am totally deprived of the right to be dangerous.”

Christopher Morris, discussing THE BOOK OF DANIEL in his full-length study of Doctorow’s fiction (MODELS OF MISREPRESENTATION), has accurately remarked that among critics the “most controversial issue is disagreement as to whether the novel finally ‘endorses’ Daniel-as-artist and the process of narrative in general.” Citing the “division of opinion on this subject” as evidence that “Daniel’s empirical and narrational quests may be foredoomed to contradiction,” Morris’ deconstructionist reading correctly identifies the ambiguous and self-contradictory nature of Daniel’s narrative, and in the process manages to extinguish any scintilla of purpose or meaning his narrative might possess. Following in the steps of Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller, Morris typically finds in the text’s contradictions proof of its “futility” and “dysfunction.”

I encourage the reader to consider that contradiction does not necessarily equal futility, that in fact postmodern writers in particular productively employ ambivalence in order to spotlight the contradictions inherent in a liberal humanist discourse which falsely operates under the sign of the natural or uncontradictory. Such an equivocal set of circumstances doesn’t stop Doctorow from writing; nor does it stop Daniel from coming down out of his ivory tower and taking action, however unsatisfactory or co-opted his gesture may be. The imperative is to avoid paralysis through analysis, to escape becoming a starfish like Susan, handless arms curled inward fetally. “My sister is dead,” Daniel writes toward the end of his narrative. “She died of a failure of analysis.” In a nutshell, this is the novel’s politically charged, if ambivalent, message: uncertainty in no way mitigates the necessity to perform.

I mean that literally, in a very “Judith Butlerian” sense: Daniel’s book is in every way a novel about the performance of power (or lack thereof). It’s no accident the text’s dominant–indeed, empowering–structural metaphor is electricity. As T. V. Reed has written in what I consider the best single article on Doctorow’s novel, “Genealogy/Narrative/Power: Questions of Postmodernity in Doctorow’s THE BOOK OF DANIEL, “Ubiquitous electrical metaphors come to embody the simultaneously destructive and productive nature of power … Electricity is at once the benign power that lights the library where Daniel writes and the terrible power that electrocutes his parents.”

Geoffrey Galt Harpham also stresses the importance of electricity in Doctorow’s text, and its double-edged quality, describing electricity as that which “ground[s] meaning and validate[s] narrative by dissolving the individual. Electrical awareness, we can conclude, is a fatal enlightenment.” Power is performed or experienced in the total absence of any “grounding,” to use Harpham’s word, in the historical or factual “real.” This is the first of Doctorow’s postmodern strategies: the stable referent of rational empiricist epistemology is liquidated and replaced by a Foucaultian network of discourse which simultaneously produces and obscures the real.

Nowhere is the real installed and subverted so conspicuously as in Daniel’s failed attempts to determine his parents’ guilt or innocence. We recognize in his gesture a desire for hermeneutical closure which participates in the same cold war, us/them, either/or logic that condemned Paul and Rochelle Isaacson to the electric chair. But the textual “evidence” (“History, that pig”) will repeatedly deny such closure.

Early in the novel Daniel, reflecting on a quasi-legendary couple who may or may not have been the actual atomic spies, writes that his parents “went to their deaths for crimes they did not commit. Or maybe they did committ them. Or maybe my mother and father got away with false passports for crimes they didn’t committ. How do you spell comit? Of one thing we are sure. Everything is elusive. Justice is elusive. Human character. Quarters for the cigarette machine.”

This is one of dozens of moments when Daniel, attempting to make sense of the past, runs up against an intractable ambiguity. Having thoroughly researched his parents’ case, both his own private and the public versions, Daniel is forced to admit, “I find no clues either to their guilt or innocence. Perhaps they are neither guilty nor innocent.” Daniel’s thinking at times borders on a radical or extreme skepticism, as he comes close to disavowing the veracity of his own narrative and thus self-consciously relegating himself to fictional status: “Probably none of this is true.”

Such textual ambiguity reaches a crescendo during Daniel’s Christmas odyssey to Disneyland. Robert Alter has called the novel’s brilliant analysis of this most “American” of places “monstrously disproportionate.” But perhaps it’s meant to be. Arguably, Doctorow is suggesting that Disneyland itself, everything it stands for, occupies a “monstrously disproportionate” place in U. S. culture.

Be that as it may, the way Daniel describes it, Disneyland is the great bodying forth of the hyperreal, much as it is in Jean Baudrillard’s famous, if belated, essay. In “Simulacres et simulations,” Baudrillard writes that Disneyland “est là pour cacher que c’est le pays ‘réel,’ toute l’Amérique ‘réelle’ qui est Disneyland … Disneyland est posé comme imaginaire afin de faire croire que le reste est réel, alors que tout Los Angeles et l’Amérique qui l’entoure ne sont déjà plus réels, mais de l’ordre de l’hyperréel et de la simulation.”

Similarly, Doctorow/Daniel observes “a separation of two ontological degrees between the Disneyland customer and the cultural artifacts he is presumed upon to treasure in his visit. The Mad Hatter’s Teacup Ride is emblematic of the Disney animated film, which is itself a drastic revision in form and content of a subtle dreamwork created out of the English language. And even to an adult who dimly remembers reading the original ALICE, and whose complicated response to this powerfully symbolic work has long since been incorporated into the psychic constructs of his life, what is being offered does not suggest the resonance of the original work, but is only a sentimental compression of something that is itself already a lie … We find this radical process of reduction occurring too with regard to the nature of historical reality.”

Coincidentally or otherwise, both Baudrillard and Doctorow characterize Disneyland as a postmodern avatar of the Nazi concentration camp. Baudrillard remarks of Disneyland’s parking lot that it is indeed a “véritable camp de concentration,” whereas in THE BOOK OF DANIEL Disneyland, located “somewhere between Buchenwald and Belsen,” is remarkable for its “handling of crowds”: “The problems of mass ingress and egress seem to have been solved here to a degree that would light admiration in the eyes of an SS transport officer.”

The principal difference between Baudrillard and Doctorow/Daniel’s versions of Disneyland lies in their respective attitudes toward its temporality. Baudrillard emphasizes that Disneyland is the sign that America is no longer real (which implies that supposedly it once was); but it’s far from certain that for Doctorow and his narrator Disneyland is anything other than a symbol for mediated “reality” in a transhistorical sense.

Several critics have remarked the spiral, if not exactly circular, pattern of Doctorow’s vision of history. Consider Baby’s collage entitled “EVERYTHING THAT CAME BEFORE IS ALL THE SAME!” Or Doctorow’s own statement that “surely the sense we have to have now of twentieth-century political alternatives is the kind of exhaustion of them all.” Doctorow is best approached not as a resigned pessimist, but as an engaged skeptic.

His skepticism extends to all types of cultural production, including his own. “I worry about images,” Daniel self-critically muses in a passage constructed through a series of images. “Images are what things mean. Take the word image. It connotes soft, sheer flesh shimmering on the air, like the rainbowed slick of a bubble. Image connotes images, the multiplicity being an image. Images break with a small ping, their destruction is as wonderful as their being, they are essentially instruments of torture exploding through the individual’s calloused capacity to feel powerful undifferentiated emotions full of longing and dissatisfaction and monumentality. They serve no social purpose.”

This severe auto-critique, the self-reflexive problematizing of the medium itself is eminently postmodernist. But the critical commentary on images doesn’t stop with the narrative; it highlights as well the New Left and its radical extreme embodied in the Jerry Rubin-like (and dubiously named) Artie Sternlicht.

Sternlicht’s political strategies are rendered suspect not only because they ring naively revolutionary and ahistorical in their narcissism–“A revolution happens. It’s a happening! It’s a change on the earth. It’s a new animal. A new consciousness! It’s me! I am Revolution!”–but also because they depend integrally on the power of images. “We’re going to overthrow the United States with images!” he triumphantly proclaims, oblivious in his disdain of liberal “Co-optation” that his “revolutionary” images are almost by definition co-opted by the system that controls the media. (The suggestion is that Sternlicht is, in essence, licking the system’s behind.) Readers seeking easy answers to complex political dilemmas are advised to look elsewhere. Radicalism of one kind or another may be the only viable alternative to liberal humanism in Doctorow’s novel, but it remains far from cause for celebration. As Daniel soberly puts it, “In a world divided in two the radical is free to choose one side or the other. That’s the radical choice.”

As previously noted, Disneyland is the site of the text’s climactic ambiguity, which occurs in arguably the novel’s most fully realized scene: Daniel’s brief visit with his parents’ friend and betrayer, Selig Mindish. Having flown to California with the intention of finally getting to the truth behind his parents’ presumed espionage, and having with some difficulty convinced a defensive Linda Mindish, Selig’s daughter, to give him an audience with her father, Daniel greets the atrophied, senile Selig under the Coca-Cola Tomorrowland Terrace:

I said, “Hello, Mr. Mindish. I’m Daniel Isaacson. I’m Paul and Rochelle’s son. Danny?”

Linda was kneeling beside him holding his hand. He struggled to understand me. His head stirred like a turtle’s head coming out of its shell. He smiled and nodded. Then as he looked in my eyes he became gradually still, and even his facial palsy ceased, and he no longer smiled. I was sickened to see water well from the congested yellow corners of his eyes. Tears tracked down his face.

“Denny?”

“It’s all right, Papa,” Linda was saying. She patted his hand. She had begun to cry. “It’s all right, Papa.”

“It’s Denny?”

For one moment of recognition he was restored to life. In wonder he raised his large, clumsy hand and touched the side of my face. He found the back of my neck and pulled me forward and leaned toward me and touched the top of my head with his palsied lips.

This is how the chapter ends, and with it Daniel’s prolonged search for the “real” truth about his parents. “The truth was beyond reclamation,” he admits as he proceeds to “do” Paul and Rochelle’s electrocution. Daniel thus exposes the myth of History as an objective or essential past reality for what it truly is: a matter of guesswork, retelling and, in this case, his story.

Accompanying the disappearance of the real (or the emplotment of the real within and as conflictual discourses) we witness the continuous fragmentation and decentering of the traditional liberal humanist subject. This is the second of Doctorow’s postmodern strategies, and is carried out simultaneously on both stylistic and thematic levels. The distinction between form and content, however, is largely a bogus one, especially in postmodern novels like THE BOOK OF DANIEL which routinely foreground the “content of the(ir) form.” I employ the distinction as an organizing tool, but the text makes clear that the medium is the message. Consider the novel’s opening:

On Memorial Day in 1967 Daniel Lewin thumbed his way from New York to Worcester, Mass., in just under five hours. With him was his young wife, Phyllis, and their eight-month-old son, Paul, whom Daniel carried in a sling chair strapped to his shoulders like a pack. The day was hot and overcast with the threat of rain, and the early morning traffic was wondering–I mean the early morning traffic was light, but not many drivers could pass them without wondering who they were and where they were going.

This is a Thinline felt tip marker, black. This is Composition Notebook 79C made in U.S.A. by Long Island Paper Products, Inc. This is Daniel trying one of the dark coves of the Browsing Room. Books for browsing are on the shelves. I sit at a table with a floor lamp at my shoulder …

The abrupt metafictional intrusion–“This is a Thinline felt tip marker,” etc.–is Daniel-as-author’s first of many attempts to ground his narrative in the real in the face of a vertiginous past. And yet in the very same passage subjectivity undercuts his would-be objectivity as the omniscient third person voice is subverted by an abrupt–and as it were, involuntary–slippage into the first person. This undermining of “critical distance,” to use Frederic Jameson’s phrase, is a constant throughout, as I becomes he becomes I becomes he (and sometimes becomes Paul or Rochelle or Jacob Ascher, the Isaacsons’ lawyer) in bewildering rhythms and involutions. This process explodes the notion of a discrete, coherent, unified self.

The vast majority of criticism on THE BOOK OF DANIEL assumes a hermeneutical approach, reading Daniel’s narrative as a Bildungsroman (admittedly, a twisted one) which concludes with a sense of self-discovery. While it’s true that Daniel escapes death-by-paralysis, the “self” he ultimately discovers is unthinkable in, say, a Dickens novel.

Daniel himself suggests as much, labeling the more traditional aspects of his narrative “David Copperfield kind of crap.” The narrative “I,” the linchpin of the classic realist “novel as Private I”–with its presumptions of freedom, self-reliance and linear development–is shown to be always already produced, spoken, circumscribed. “Caught at the center of … conflicting generational forces,” explains Reed, “Daniel Isaacson’s story is one of learning the extent to which he, the ostensible narrator, is also in many ways the narrated.”

The paradox Daniel uncovers through writing is properly postmodern, as he finds himself authoring the story he has himself been authored by. Over the course of his career, according to Harpham’s essay “E. L. Doctorow and the Technology of Narrative,” Doctorow “has approached the position that there is no such thing as a uniquely human character, that the self is both the cause and effect of processes and elements generally thought of as external to the self.” I would only diverge from Harpham’s assessment by urging that this process is already complete in THE BOOK OF DANIEL.

Carmichael has argued that the novel juxtaposes “two literary modes–realism and postmodernism–as a method for bridging the two historical eras in which those modes prevailed: the pre-Rosenberg period of the old left, and the post-Rosenberg period of the 1960s and the New Left.” I agree that the novel places these two periods in opposition, along with the notions of “individual” and “subject” which respectively characterize them. But Carmichael’s view of purely “realistic” and “postmodern” literary modes, in addition to ignoring an important middle term (modernism), strikes me as naive.

A more productive way of reading Daniel’s narrative, in my opinion, is as an example of Bakhtinian heteroglossia. In addition to elements of the dissertation form, the text appropriates virtually every “literary” genre imaginable: realism, metafiction, historiography, confession, letters, diaries, journalism, advertising, notes to the reader, etc. Such a bouillabaisse of genres, rather than being gratuitous as some critics have claimed, constitutes a veritable recipe for critiquing any totalizing system, be it literary or political, individual or universal. This is an invasive novel in which the public is private, and the private is public, in which the long arm of the law literally comes into the home, in which personal letters become party documents, in which small children are used as pawns in a political struggle of great historical consequence. Daniel’s book is a purposeful refusal of simple ideologies of the discrete self and, by extension, of a unified national identity.

Such masculist capitalist ideologies (to use Carmichael’s phrase) are made manifest in the reification of antagonistic categories: patriot versus communist, American versus un-American (as in HUAC, the House Un-American Activities Committee), New Left versus Old Left, white versus black, light versus darkness. Categories are just words, of course, but as Doctorow/Daniel portrays them, they take on a life of their own, assume a physicality of sorts as dangerous as any bullet.

Consider, for example, the harrowing scene following the Paul Robeson concert, in which the bus transporting the Isaacson family and their fellow travelers is attacked by reactionaries: “Flying in with the rocks, like notes tied to them with string, the words kike, commie bastard, jew commie, red. I listen carefully. Jew. Commie. Red. Nigger. Bastard. Kike. Niggerlover. Red. Jew bastard. These words are shouted. The rocks, some of them as big as my head, are propelled by the motives of education. ‘We’ll teach you!’ the enraged voices cry. ‘This will teach you, you commie bastard kikes!’”

“Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me.” Daniel’s description challenges this puerile “truism” as epithets rain down with the rocks, like the rocks, on the people trapped inside the stalled bus. This is just before Daniel’s father, indignant at such injustice, attempts to intervene and the patriots snap his arm like a stick of wood. This is one of countless moments in the novel when categories serve as catalysts for violence. The point is that categories may be only words, possessing no empirical reality, but they affect how people think about the world, and that affects how they act in it.

Labeled “spies” with little or no factual evidence to back up such a claim, the Isaacsons, like the Rosenbergs, acquire firsthand knowledge of the power of categories to define and destroy. Paul Levine Butler puts it beautifully in his discussion of the fatal error of both the Old Left, typified by Paul Isaacson, and the New (represented by Sternlicht). “Like Paul, [Sternlicht] underestimates the repressive power of the state and overestimates the revolutionary power of the individual,” writes Levine. “According to Sternlicht, society is a ‘put-on’ sustained by the inertia of authority which can be exposed as simple illusion. Society may be a put-on but it still has the power to electrocute you.”

This kind of authority is what Doctorow in “False Documents” calls the “power of the regime.” He equates this power with the soft terrorism (the phrase is Lyotard’s) of rational empiricist thinking, which he subsumes under the label “realism.” Opposing such naturalized and naturalizing authority is the “power of freedom,” basically another name for fiction. Harpham cleverly demonstrates how this essay, which dichotomizes the real and the imaginary only to collapse the distinction between them under the rubric of narrative, “is itself an especially complicated kind of false document,” one that proves its point (like the Rosenberg/Isaacson case) by resisting true/false (or guilty/not guilty) interpretations.

Indeed, one could argue that the central thrust of Doctorow’s fiction is against precisely such binary thinking. In THE BOOK OF DANIEL resistance to realism takes various forms, most prominently at the level of style, where objectivity is repeatedly undercut by subjectivity, omniscience diluted by ignorance.

For example, in the scene described above where Paul suffers a broken arm, Daniel, who finds himself squeezed down between the seats under his mother’s protective embrace and in no position to witness the events he recounts, briefly interrupts his narrative to ask, “How do I know this?” A non sequitur within the context, the question nevertheless obsesses Daniel, who returns to it over and over. How does one know anything? What is truth? Where and how to seek it? This is where the power of freedom intervenes, the power of fiction to know in ways unavailable to the regime of science, to go places off-limits to traditional, “objective” historiography. A “criminal of perception” since childhood, Daniel-as-artist is a born social critic able to see around and through, and even beyond, the stultifying binary “logic” which perpetuates U. S. terrorism at home and abroad.

This brings up the role of the reader, who is also, like the writer-as-witness, a “criminal of perception,” an involved observer in the (hi)story being created: “The monstrous reader who goes on from one word to the next. The monstrous writer who places one word after another.” “I suppose you think I can’t do the electrocution,” Daniel addresses the reader toward the end of the novel. “I know there is a you. There has always been a you. YOU: I will show you that I can do the electrocution.”

In the cruel scene where Daniel prepares to burn his wife with a cigarette lighter, the reader is practically defined as a voyeur: “Who are you anyway?” Daniel interrupts his narrative to ask. “Who told you you could read this? Is nothing sacred?” On the subject of the responsibility of the contemporary novelist, Doctorow has written, “At issue is the human mind, which has to be shocked, seduced, or otherwise provoked out of its habitual stupor.” And yet one of the most “shocking” passages in the novel never even occurs. Instead, Daniel’s act of sadism practiced on his wife is replaced by a description of the famous scene in Buñuel’s UN CHIEN ANDALOU where the razor slices the eyeball.

This substitution explicitly calls attention to the blindness inherent in seeing. I believe Doctorow/Daniel stops short of deconstructing the narrative project of creating consciousness into an abysmal, de Manian blindness of insight. But the text does point in a very postmodern way to the problems and ambiguities produced in the act of recognition. No such recognition is ever impartial. The scientist is always part of the experiment. As writers and as readers, we’re unavoidably complicit in–and at least partially, blind to–the narratives we produce and which simultaneously produce us.

Thus far this essay has been concerned to demonstrate the extent to which THE BOOK OF DANIEL is a meditation on the nature and effects of discursive categories. The novel is also, as I’ve argued, a dramatization of the necessity of taking action in an uncertain world. The rhetoricizing of the real and the decentering of the subject serve not as excuses for avoiding, but as incitements to performance. As Butler has eloquently written, “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”

This brings us to the third important ramification of Butler’s theory as articulated in GENDER TROUBLE and enumerated in my previous essay “Postmodern Politics: The Rhetoric of the Referent & the Performance of Identity”: categories cannot be escaped, but they can be modified. And they are modified in a very particular way: through performance. Referring to his merciless impersonation of the Inertia Kid, Daniel confesses that it was “the only time in my life I have ever performed. I haven’t got a performing nature.” But this expression of false modesty should fool no one: since childhood Daniel has lived in the spotlight. Indeed, his very existence is inscribed within a textual performance of considerable skill and magnitude, a performance which in its turns describes numerous performances, large and small.

Daniel’s acts of rebellion and resistance (including his narrative) may very well be complicit with or co-opted by the system, but they are not only complicit and co-opted. As Butler has clearly demonstrated, subversion operates within, not outside, the system. Daniel’s quest for a political alternative to the liberal humanist Old Left and the ahistorical, narcissistic New Left is as unsuccessful as his search for the truth about his parents. In the end his only recourse is to make the best of a difficult situation, to take up the tools where they lie and get busy challenging, however tentatively, the government that has destroyed his family.

Referring to the 1967 antiwar March on the Pentagon during which Daniel is beaten up and imprisoned, Reed has written that with “his sister’s death Daniel gives up the possibility of escaping the stories History is telling and instead gives himself to the best story he can find: the problematic but honorable story of resistance being written by the protesting bodies of young women and men of the New Left.” Daniel’s political performance–which includes both the antiwar gesture itself and the narrative act of articulating it–may be problematic, but it’s hardly without hope.

No reading of THE BOOK OF DANIEL would be complete without at least briefly addressing the novel’s three endings. Some critics have taken the plurality of endings as an instance of postmodern indeterminacy. Morris goes a step further, claiming, “It is hard to think of an ending that more dramatically trashes the idea of meaning in an ending.” Needless to say, I vehemently disagree. Rather, I believe with Carmichael that the novel’s three endings “follow instead a progressive logic … having to do with saying goodbye to outmoded forms of life and stepping down into the world from the security of a purely mental and reflective environment.” In this spirit I propose the following interpretations:

1. THE HOUSE. Daniel’s return to a home no longer his own, a home which effectively no longer exists, mirrors his progressive realization that the past “real” is inaccessible. A postmodern rewriting of the modernist fable, this ending demonstrates that YOU CAN’T GO HOME AGAIN. Literally. Daniel is exiled from the objective historical past in the direction of an undetermined, conjectural future. “Exile for the intellectual,” writes Edward Said, “… is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others.” I find this to be an accurate description of Daniel’s narrative.

2. THE FUNERAL. The funeral referred to is actually two funerals: Daniel’s parents’ and his sister’s. One way of interpreting the conflation of the two is to view them together as symbolic of the death of revolution. Describing Susan’s funeral, which takes place on “one of those peculiar days of warmth with spring leaking through,” Daniel writes, “It is the kind of day the crocuses get fucked, exposing their petaled insides of delicate hue, yellow and white, lavender and flesh, to the spring. And it is too soon. It’s a miscalculation. Crocus, first flower, dead flower, flower of revolutionaries.” Revolutionary ideals, whether those of the Old Left (Paul and Rochelle) or the New (Susan), are doomed–at least for now–to failure. Daniel’s description recalls Susan’s “THEY’RE STILL FUCKING US,” a veritable refrain throughout the novel, where us might refer to anyone willing to challenge the powers-that-be. It’s important to note that Daniel has chosen not to be a crocus. They’re still fucking him, but he’ll live to fight another day. A different fight, with different rules.

3. THE LIBRARY. At some point the narrative, like all narratives, must end. At some point it’s necessary to leave the stacks and “see what’s going down.” Daniel has been “liberated,” but as he has come to realize, words mean nothing until they are made to mean. And words are made to mean by being performatively transformed into discrete acts by discrete bodies. The critical importance of this transubstantiation–of the word literally being made flesh–is suggested, ironically, by the biblical citation which concludes the text: “Go thy way Daniel: for the words are closed up and sealed till the time of the end.” Hutcheon observes that these “words of closure are of closure sous rature, so to speak …as [they] are opened up (not closed up) by our act of reading.”

Thus the ultimate performative transubstantiation occurs–or fails to occur–in the reader. Daniel’s book has “opened up” new ways of thinking of resistance, scripted new possibilities for political action that need to be explored. It is up to us as players in the human drama to make good on by embodying them.

Copyright (c) 2010 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

Writing the Monument: Sylvia Plath's Answer to Death in THE BELL JAR

Sol Luckman

Not marble, nor the gilded monuments
Of princes, shall outlive this powerful rhyme ...
Shakespeare, Sonnet 65

Faced with the inevitability of death, writers throughout history have sought to capture their identity (or another's) in their work as a way of transcending time. Perhaps the greatest example of such literary immortalization may be found in Shakespeare's sonnets, which often revolve around this posterity motif, but countless other writers have responded in their own fashion to the specter of death. The Romantic poets, for instance, obsessed with the fear of loss of self, often viewed their poetry as the only possible container for an otherwise transitory identity. And in the Twentieth Century, William Faulkner spoke of the artist as one who "[tries] to ... [carve] on the wall of oblivion, beyond which he will have to pass, in the tongue of the human spirit, 'Kilroy was here.'"

It is thus not surprising that, in her autobiographical novel THE BELL JAR, Sylvia Plath should likewise desire to eternalize herself in the face of annihilation. Plath goes beyond mere rhetoric, however: THE BELL JAR may be read as a series of attempts, not unlike Shakespeare's sonnet sequence, to find a lasting container for a complex inner reality, culminating in the creation of the novel itself, which becomes the ultimate vessel for that reality. In the words of A. Alvarez, "It is as though [Plath] had decided that, for her [writing] to be valid, it must tackle head-on nothing less serious than her own death."

From the very first sentence of the novel, death looms frighteningly close for Esther Greenwood, Plath's fictional persona: "It was a queer, sultry summer, the summer they electrocuted the Rosenbergs, and I didn't know what I was doing in New York." As is here intimated, and as we will see clearly later in the novel, Esther is headed for a profound confrontation with her mortality when she undergoes electrotherapy. Following Esther's treatment, in the words of Gordon Lameyer, Esther "[enters] deeper and deeper into this world of death" until she attempts suicide in Chapter Thirteen. Here the parallels between Esther and the author's own life are neatly drawn. Even on an extremely sophisticated level, Plath never lets us forget that "all flesh is grass": "with each flash a great jolt drubbed me till I thought my bones would break and the sap fly out of me like a split plant " (italics mine).

What Esther fears in death is homogeneity. For her, mortality is the great equalizer, and her fear of death is closely linked to her fear of the void, of permanent identity loss. Referring to THE BELL JAR, Edward Butsher speaks of Plath's "central obsession with Kierkegaard's 'fear of nothingness.'" It is evident throughout the novel that Esther harbors a similar dread: "I felt myself melting into the shadows like the negative of the person I'd never seen before in my life." Or later, in Chapter Four: "I looked round me at all the rows of rapt little heads with the same silver glow on them and the same black shadow on them at back, and they looked like nothing more or less than a lot of stupid moonbrains" (italics mine). Even Esther's "panic-struck" reaction to physics may be interpreted as an outgrowth of her fear and indignation at what she considers a denial of individuality on the part of this "equalizing" science, which breaks everything down into faceless components and formulae.

Esther feels that she must act or be swallowed by time. But what to do with such a fragile identity? How to fight back against death? In light of these questions, Esther's answer to Jay Cee's "inquisition" concerning her future takes on profoundest significance: "'I don't really know,' I heard myself say. I felt a deep shock, hearing myself say that, because the minute I said it, I knew it was true."

Thus begins the narrator's quest, both for a unified self, as pointed out by such critics as Lameyer and Marjorie Perloff, and for a nonperishable vessel to carry that self into the future. Perloff asserts that "the central action of THE BELL JAR may be described as the attempt to heal the fracture between inner self and false-self system so that a real and viable identity can come into existence." While true, we must add that such a critical approach is limited in that it fails to account for Esther's simultaneous struggle to immortalize her emerging identity.

The "monumental" nature of Esther's struggle is emphasized by the recurrence of various types of symbolic containers. Concerning the primary function of the oft-used image of the mirror, we could remark of Esther what she says of Hilda: "She [stares] at her reflection ... as if to make sure, moment by moment, that she [continues] to exist." The image of the bathtub, which occurs twice in the novel, also recalls Esther's search for a receptacle. Whether "coffin-shaped" and "marble," or simply a good place to lie after slitting one's wrists as Esther imagines it in Chapter Twelve, the bathtub is an unmistakable symbol of containment after death.

The telephone is yet another recurring image in THE BELL JAR. And though, unlike the mirror and the bathtub, it is not a symbolic container, the telephone nevertheless plays an important role, thematically, in Esther's struggle to immortalize her identity. Described as both a "death's head" and as having a "bone-colored cradle," the telephone becomes an image of insistent death, of imminent identity loss, a problem that must be "answered." (Plath appreciates a good pun.) Foreshadowing her ultimate response (i.e., narrating the novel), Esther does give an answer: she "[lifts] the receiver and [speaks] in a husky, receptive voice" (italics mine).

In his essay "The Double in Sylvia Plath's THE BELL JAR," Lameyer, like Perloff, explains the novel in terms of the narrator's search for a distinct identity. According to Lameyer, Esther systematically identifies with another person
Betsy, Doreen, Hilda, then Joanin an attempt to define herself, before rejecting this "double" as insufficient or bogus. Thus THE BELL JAR becomes a progression toward self-actualization, leading Esther from New York, to and through her would-be suicide, and ultimately beyond her "madness" to the sense of identity and rebirth with which the novel ends. Yet, here again, we must realize that Lameyer's approach, while revealing, is inadequate to describe the full complexity of Esther's struggle: the pure "psychological approach" fails to establish convincing reasons for Esther's rejection of all doubles.

If we keep in mind that Esther's search is not only a quest for self, but also an effort to immortalize that self, then it becomes apparent that her doubles are themselves symbolic containers of identity, each being rejected in turn as she (the double) shows herself to be, in Perloff's words, "essentially a flawed human being." In other words, as Esther struggles to establish her identity, and at the same time a lasting vessel for that identity, she discovers doubles to be insufficient because any double will necessarily share her own human frailty. She cannot locate her identity in a medium as ephemeral as herself. Plath wrote in her college honors thesis: "Often the double becomes an ape or shadow which presages death and destruction."

The most striking examples of the "inadequate" double are Joan, who is likened throughout to a horse, with obvious connotations of strength and vitality; and Doreen, who is described as having "eyes ... hard and polished and just about indestructible" and "blonde hair ... like a halo of gold." Yet both of these seemingly indefatigable doubles are rejected. Esther "[dissociates] [herself] from Joan completely," and Joan later commits suicide. Doreen, similarly rejected, becomes at the very moment of rejection a powerful symbol of Esther's mortality in contrast to the "eternally verdant" carpet on which Doreen lies: "I think I still expected to see Doreen's body lying there in the pool of vomit like an ugly, concrete testimony to my own dirty nature."

The psychological approach is also inadequate in that it virtually ignores the literary implications of the text itself. Plath herself once said: "Nothing stinks like a pile of unpublished writing ... I still want to see it finally ritualized in print" (italics mine). This attitude on Plath's part is related to the desire for literary eternalization we discussed in the introduction. As we will see, more than a result of psychosis or neurosis or divided self, THE BELL JAR is in fact the product of the author's need to find an enduring container.

Esther's fear of death, intimately tied to her "fear of nothingness," is also inextricably bound up in her dread of not becoming a great writer, whose work, like Shakespeare's, will transcend death and thereby eternalize the creative identity. This is a key concept to grasp in order to understand the novel. While renouncing doubles; religion ("Of course, I didn't believe in life after death"); and
as we will later demonstratesexuality as means of "beating death," Esther turns increasingly to literature for salvation. Thus her "panic" when "darkness [wipes] [her] out like chalk on a blackboard" (italics mine). And thus her crisis and breakdown when, having found no other suitable container for her identity, she discovers that she has not been accepted into the writing course she has looked forward to, as if the course, or rather her writing, were a "safe bridge over the dull gulf of the summer," a summer which is "like death."

Clearly, what terrifies Esther here is the wordless "gap" into which, her writing having failed, she ("a body in a white blouse and green skirt") will inevitably "plummet" (italics mine). What to do? At this point, Esther feels that nothing can be done, no container can be found. She believes she has been defeated by oblivion. Her writing, as judged by her creative writing professor, is "factitious, artificial, sham." According to Lameyer, she "recalls all the criticism of her life and writing that anyone ever made and accepts [this] judgment." She has been unsuccessful in finding or creating a container for her emerging identity, and in the ultimate act of despair, she attempts suicide by crawling into a nook in the cellar and swallowing a bottle of sleeping pills.

The irony of this attempted suicide is twofold. First, the act itselfclimbing into a tight damp space evocative of a womb and suggestive of Esther's desire to rebecome "the white sweet baby cradled in its mother's belly"is a symbolic search for a container. The fact that her would-be suicide fails contributes to this irony and produces a second paradox: Esther's attempted suicide is what sparks her recovery; in trying to end herself, she is actually beginning anew her search for identity and immortalization, a search ending in the creation of the novel itself, the fruit of her recovery. Viewed in this manner, even the title takes on great significance. "Bell," pronounced aloud, sounds exactly like the French belle, such as in the phrase "southern belle"; jar comes from the Arabic jarrah, which designates a type of earthen vessel. If there was any doubt before, there can be none now: Plath is looking for a jar in which to put the belle.

Esther's recovery is only a matter of time: THE BELL JAR, like winter, invevitably moves toward a season of rebirth. What has been generally overlooked by critics, however, is that her recovery is tied not only to her emerging sense of identity, as pointed out by the psychological approach, but also to Esther's knowledge that she can and will write again, that she will find a way to immortalize herself in writing. It is no coincidence that in the closing chapter of the novel, Esther experiences in nature something similar to the dissolution of writer's block: "I could hear a musical trickle and drip as the sun thawed icicles and snow crusts." And the mention of "a pure, blank sheet" is rather blunt in its evocation of literary birth.

In the end, Esther's writing, no longer a form of escape from reality as it was when she wrote "villanelles and sonnets" in Mr. Manzi's chemistry class, becomes a way of confronting reality. Her belief, expressed early in the novel, in the power of words to endure beyond other mortal endeavors, triumphs: "People were made of nothing so much as dust, and I couldn't see that doctoring all that dust was a bit better than writing poems people would remember and repeat to themselves when they were unhappy or sick or couldn't sleep."

Esther's solution to the problem of death remains strictly verbal. Plath provides us with certain valuable indications that, though her narrator overcomes her fear of sexuality, marries and has children, her answer to death and loss of self does not lie in progeny. One reason for this, as expressed by Lameyer, is that "birth was inextricably bound up in [Plath's] mind with death." Throughout the text, Esther makes us aware that immortalizing herself through genesis, by creating a type of genetic continuum, is not an option: "Children made me sick." Or her bitter cynicism when Buddy Willard says that "after [Esther] [has] children ... [she] [won't] want to write poems any more." Or, after recounting the story of the nun and the Jew under the fig treean obvious symbol of sexualityEsther's "literary" (and "anti-progeny") impulse to "crawl in between those black lines of print the way you crawl through a fence, and go to sleep under that beautiful big fig tree" (italics mine). Here again, we find the narrator's desire to contain her individuality in writing, as opposed to seeking refuge in childbearing as a means of continuum.

The final irony in THE BELL JAR, and in our discussion of the novel, is the novel itself: our taking time and energy to examine Plath's attempt to eternalize herself in Esther Greenwood is testimony that she has done so. As long as there is a reader, the author's identity can never be lost; THE BELL JAR becomes Plath's monument to withstand time. Her "I am, I am, I am," an allusion to Samuel Coleridge's concept of the "infinite I am" (itself an allusion to biblical divinity and an assertion that words create the monument), can never fade. To but slightly rephrase Shakespeare's Sonnet #65: THE BELL JAR is Plath's way of saying, "in black ink my [life] may still shine bright."

Copyright (c) 2010 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

Seeing Is Believing?: Art, Shifting Epistemologies & Femininity around 1848

Sol Luckman

The year 1848 is often cited by scholars as pivotal in the development of modern culture. Rather than examine it, as most theorists do, from a political perspective, however, I wish to explore to 1848 within the context of artistic production and evolution.

In continental Europe, in the work of Gustave Flaubert, for example, as in L’EDUCATION SENTIMENTALE, 1848 is patently hard to ignore. In America one experiences 1848’s hulking presence, covert and overt, as a kind lietmotif in Herman Melville’s THE PIAZZA TALES—from the operatic mutiny staged aboard the San Dominick in “Benito Cereno,” to the specific historical reference in the title story, “It was not long after 1848, and, somehow, about that time, all round the world these kings, they had the casting vote, and voted for themselves.”

For me, what is particularly interesting about this date, and the events it summarizes, apart from its decidedly historical or social ramifications as reflected in the literature of the period, is that it marks at once the apex and the beginning of the decline of literary realism.

This is not a new idea for anyone familiar with the theories of George Lukács. Within a few short years around 1848, we see published such “realistic” novels as WUTHERING HEIGHTS, DOMBEY AND SON and MARY BARTON, not to mention a proliferation of “sociological” studies in the vein of Friedrich Engels’ CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND. At the same time, the period surrounding 1848 gives rise to THE PIAZZA TALES and MADAME BOVARY, works which signal the deterioration of realism while pointing forward to a literature that will question and finally shatter realism’s basic premise, put so wonderfully by Stendhal, that the novel should be like a faithful mirror traveling along a road.

When I use the term “realism,” I mean to imply an intentionality (problematic as the term may be) to create fiction capable of mirroring reality, establishing referentiality, and conveying to the reader an undeniable sense of the “real” world. Realism is a fiction in which signifier and signified are supposed to exist in one-to-one relationship, a happy marriage of symbol and thing. Pure realism would be excessively naïve; fortunately, literature is a mutt, bred of many inconsistencies and outright paradoxes, and such a thing as “pure realism” exists only as a critically useful concept.

Roland Barthes has convincingly argued that “what we call ‘real’ (in the theory of the realistic text) is never more than a code of representation ... it is never a code of execution.” Even Stendhal, that paragon of realism, often dashes to bits our willing suspension of disbelief. In LE ROUGE ET LE NOIR, for example, in one of several passages that sound more like TRISTRAM SHANDY than the work of a realist, Stendhal writes, “Ici l’auteur eût voulu placer une page de points. Cela aura mauvaise grâce, dit l’éditeur.”

Among the historical factors impacting the development of the English novel around 1848 include, but are not necessarily limited to: the revolutionary events in France; the failure of Chartism at home; the crystallization of England as the quintessence of capitalist culture; the growth of divided urban centers as a result of capitalist economics and policies; and the proliferation of photography as a means of apprehending “reality” and documenting “history.” Of these influences on the novel, the most interesting, and in a formalist sense the most convincing, is the last: the impact of photography.

In France this abrupt cultural dependence on photographic documentation, as well as its mirroring in the novel—which becomes increasingly “realistic,” at least in that disillusioned form of romanticism called naturalism—is perhaps easier to understand than in England. That during the Second Empire a Félix Nadar should desire to capture on film the Paris that soon will not be after Haussmann’s sweeping changes, or that a Victor Hugo should undertake a similar mission in prose, seems a rather natural human response to change.

And yet, clear as history may at times seem from our perspective, looking back, we are left with a fundamental problematic concerning the enmeshed triangle photography-literature-history: does the “realist” novel, that supple mime, mimic photography, or vice versa? Did realism somehow come about as a result of the development of photographic technology, or was that very technological development somehow a product of the increasing demands of a culture devoted to realism?

I propose that this question is essentially unanswerable. I tend to think of photography and literary realism—which were culturally prepared for, technologically and aesthetically speaking—as being born out of a particularly human need to arrest change in the face of the unprecedented dynamism of industrialism, revolution, colonialism and urbanization that transformed Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Yet, from the opposite side of the looking glass, that transformation itself might be seen as engendering new modes of representation, aesthetic as well as technological, leaving out the human element altogether.

The sudden, irresistible obsession for turning objects into their visible traces. Why the explosion of pictorialism in England? And why, although visual culture remains the rage in the form of photography throughout the Nineteenth Century, does the novel, immediately on establishing itself as a kind of “visual” document through its presumed ability to convey a “picture” of reality, begin to question, however unconsciously at first, its status as “mirror”?

For Lukács as well, 1848 marks the decline (if not the end) of realism and the beginning of literary décadence. After this date, according to his theory, in contrast to the great historical novels of Sir Walter Scott and Balzac, European fiction increasingly conceals matters of utmost historical and political importance. Flaubert, in MADAME BOVARY, commits the first sin against society—followed by his disciple Emile Zola who succeeds in cementing literary decadence in the form of naturalism.

What Lukács understandably fails to remark—given the Marxist ideology underlying his theory—is that this famous “concealment” of history which begins with Flaubert, rather than signaling a turning away from history as such, might be thought of instead in terms of an epistemological shift away from the realist method of “knowing.” (That, in the work of Flaubert, who many consider a kind of proto-postmodernism, our ability to “know” anything is deeply problematized, is an issue I will not enter into here.) Realism is predicated on the notion that seeing is believing; the realist implicitly equates sight and knowledge. Eyewitness accounts are privileged alongside the omniscient narrator who sees and therefore “knows” all: think of Engels penetrating the depths of the city (much like Nadar, in Danteesque fashion, photographing the sewers of Paris) to reveal the literally shitty truths hidden there in his version of the “historical novel.” In short, at its apex, the realist novel considers itself—with or without justification, whether modeled on photography or not—to be on a par with photographic documentation.

This belief in the novel as camera will not die easily. Zola, for example, will insist on stretching the metaphor like a rubber band until it snaps in two and creates its own backlash. But unlike Lukács, unlike most literary historians, indeed, unlike Zola himself, I by no means think of naturalism as descending in linear fashion from Flaubert. (Nor did Flaubert, it should be remarked.) Nor do I consider naturalism the undisputed dominant aesthetic of the second half of the Nineteenth Century.

Alongside naturalism, we must consider such patently unnaturalistic works as Flaubert’s BOUVARD ET PECUCHET, Melville’s THE CONFIDENCE-MAN and Oscar Wilde’s THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY, ironically titled given the picture’s virtually organic mutations that render it more like a surrealist movie than a realist portrait. Instead of casting naturalism as the principle literary movement after realism, I tend to think of naturalism as a kind of aberration, a frantic and would-be dictatorial last attempt to live up to realism’s “photographic” premise—whereas literary as well as historical currents were well on their way to carrying the novel into troubled seas fraught with epistemological uncertainties.

With the foregoing history as a backdrop, I would now like to consider William Makepeace Thackeray’s VANITY FAIR in relation to the changing face of realism around 1848. My theory is this: VANITY FAIR, “baggy monster” that it is, represents a kind of pontoon bridge connecting the epistemological self-assurance of realism with the more problematic (and in some ways, troubling) notions about knowing we find in decadent and early modernist literature. Put another way, VANITY FAIR is perhaps the most internally contradicted novel of the period—not only at the level of form, but equally self-negating at the level of content—and it is in these very contradictions that we can see the epistemological tides changing.

Formally, Thackeray’s ponderous tome is indeed a monster. Monster here should be taken in its etymological sense as something to be shown. For VANITY FAIR, from its preface forward, is presented as pure show or spectacle. Owing to its overarching and structurally essential theatrical metaphor, VANITY FAIR might be considered the greatest example of the “visual” novel in Europe. Thackeray clearly took Shakespeare at his word: in VANITY FAIR all the world is indeed a stage.

Although the novel’s narrator is at times coy concerning his viewpoint—as when he asks “who can tell you the real truth of the matter?”—there is never any real doubt as to the presumed omniscience of Thackeray’s Godlike Manager of the Performance. The narrator’s playful denial of omniscience, as elsewhere his admission of the same, serves to normalize and universalize his point of view—a point of view which, as the phrase implies, is implicitly and explicitly visual.

VANITY FAIR is a surface world glittering with hypocrisy and injustice and notoriously lacking in depth. Thackeray’s narrator views and recounts the characters’ actions and thoughts from a higher, superior, moralizing position. Nowhere in the text do we find presented an alternative perspective on the narrated events. The characters are repeatedly represented as marionettes dangling from authorial strings. Even Becky, arguably the most “full of life” of Thackeray’s creations, is referred to as the “famous little Becky Puppet.”

And yet, striking at the very heart of this apparent objectivity, destroying the realistic stage illusion, Thackeray’s narrator insists on stumbling onto the stage with a rhythm that soon becomes predictable. He does this in a variety of ways—the most common being first person commentary and the use of metafictional devices typically designed to jolt the reader into an awareness of the fictionality of the text at hand.

Punctuated with chapter titles such as “Quite a Sentimental Chapter” and “A Cynical Chapter,” and assertions such as “But ... good chance was denied to [Rawdon and Becky], doubtless in order that this story might be written, in which numbers of their wonderful adventures are narrated,” VANITY FAIR often reads more like TOM JONES than LA CHARTREUSE DE PARME. Toward the end of the novel Thackeray himself (or his persona) makes an appearance as a character in his own text and subtly comments on the novel he has been writing. Thus, through a continual disruption of the novel’s otherwise objective frames, the narrator attempts to blur the picture, problematize the notion of realist perspective, even as he strives to construct a text whose aim is specifically to scrutinize and critique contemporary “reality” with the precision and accuracy of a magnifying glass.

I recall Robert Alter making a similar observation about Thackeray in PARTIAL MAGIC. But whereas Alter sees this internal contradiction in VANITY FAIR as a metafictional failure almost purely at the level of form, I prefer to think of Thackeray, as I stated above, in terms of an epistemological shift that was accompanied—whether as cause or effect—by an aesthetic shift.

VANITY FAIR is by no means the only Victorian novel in which we witness such a perspectival shift. I invite the reader to consider the narrator Lockwood in WUTHERING HEIGHTS, a novel eminently more down-to-earth than VANITY FAIR. Though an eyewitness, seemingly possessing the realist’s privileged viewpoint, Lockwood nevertheless manages to misread, in certain crucial aspects, the very story he narrates. This is long before Henry James wrote using the technique of the “center of consciousness” and Joseph Conrad developed that much overworked type, the “unreliable narrator.”

At the level of form, VANITY FAIR effectively cancels itself out—the novel’s “metafictional” devices, occurring with almost mind-numbing regularity, instead of shattering the normative frame of reference, come to resonate as a purely stylistic device and are thereby subsumed into the otherwise “realist” narrative. At the same time, these devices water down the novel’s realism just enough to render its intended social critique conspicuously hollow and insincere.

At the level of content as well, as I will elaborate in my discussion of the problem of Thackeray’s “satire,” there is finally little that is truly radical about VANITY FAIR—and much that is profoundly conservative. Indeed, despite its veneer of liberalism and stylistic play, VANITY FAIR may very well be the most deeply conservative of all “classic” Nineteenth-century novels. (I use the terms conservative and liberal not in their political sense, but to denote a text’s adherence or lack thereof to its period’s aesthetic and in particular social ideologies.)

In other words, Thackeray was anything but a postmodernist (or a modernist, for that matter). If VANITY FAIR at times seems to pull in opposite directions due to internal stresses—or due to external forces, if you prefer—I sincerely doubt Thackeray was conscious of the contradictions flowing from his pen, the manner in which his ostensibly monolithic, bourgeois world view is subtly undermined by his means of representation, and vice versa.

By definition the satirist is a moralist. Thackeray is more of a moralist than most—he refers to himself time and time again, in fact, as just that—and yet when, after several months of laborious reading, we finish the last page of his masterpiece and replace the book on the shelf, do we have a very clear idea at all as to what the moral of the story was?

Thackeray giveth even as he taketh away. Having dissected his characters one by one, surgically exposed their hypocrisy or cruelty or just plain stupidity, we are left at the end of the novel without redemption, without hope, and certainly without a hero—unless it be the smugly moralizing narrator himself. Dobbin a hero? Despite Thackeray’s apparent sympathy for the Major, he everywhere suggests that Dobbin needs to get a life. The same might be said for Amelia, and with greater emphasis. Even Becky, the most convincing (and for that matter, likable) character in the novel, is ultimately brought low by the satirist’s swordlike pen.

I will return to Becky and her problematic status as both woman and “artist,” but for now I would like to focus on the question of satire. The Eighteenth Century elaborated two very different—indeed, diametrically opposed—conceptions of the genre. On the one hand, Henry Fielding wrote, “The satirist is to be regarded as our physician, not our enemy.” Jonathan Swift, however, defines the genre as “a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover everybody’s face but their own; which is the chief reason for that kind of reception it meets in the world, and that so very few are offended by it.”

Opposing Fielding’s notion of satire as a social curative, Swift conceives of satire as basically an ineffectual form of moralizing. (The Dean’s pessimism, it should be noted, did not stop him from writing the Drapier’s Letters; nor did it keep the letters from successfully carrying out their worldly mission.) Where exactly does Thackeray fall on the Fielding-Swift satirical spectrum? Does the author of VANITY FAIR actually intend to improve the world by mocking it, or does he—complacent in his unattainable “normative” position—merely stick his tongue out at the world, as if to say, “I told you so”?

It should be obvious by now that the answer to both these questions is, “Yes.” Such is the nature of Thackeray’s narrative of paradoxes. It is as if the author of VANITY FAIR was suffering from split personalities. One personality clearly rings Fieldingesque in its avowed intention to lay bare English society’s evils so as to stir his readers’ sympathies and awareness. This is particularly the case when the narrator climbs on his soapbox and holds forth, as he so often does, on the fate of women: Lady Crawley’s “heart was dead long before her body. She had sold it to become Sir Pitt Crawley’s wife. Mothers and daughters are making the same bargain every day in Vanity Fair.” This example is one of dozens of such sermons in the novel. Yet, in contrast to the curative notion of satire, VANITY FAIR also abounds in more or less overt references to Swift’s definition—as the pervasive image of the harlequin (that representative denizen of Vanity Fair) contemplating himself in a cracked (and therefore distorting) mirror should leave little room to doubt.

In VANITY FAIR the troubling “oppositional” status of satire is overtly thematized; the novel’s “satire” effectively negates itself in a manner that directly parallels the “canceling out” we experience at the level of form. One is tempted to conclude, given the novel’s purely stylized ending, that Thackeray’s novel transforms satire into melodrama: Becky seems to lose value as the performance goes along and is duly chastised for her iniquity, even as the goody-goody Amelia’s star is constantly on the rise. Through its elaborate self-contradictions, VANITY FAIR cloaks and universalizes middle-class values while purporting to offer a critique of those same values. The notion of satire, in Thackeray, is thus exploded by an anti-subversive content.

VANITY FAIR is a world in which seeing is not believing. Here we return to the novel’s basic premise of stage illusion and the epistemological rift between seeing and knowing we discussed as incipient in Thackeray: his theatrical text reads, in an important sense, as the story of the conflation between seeing and failing to see, reading and blindness, knowing and not knowing. It is by examining Thackeray’s “satire” in this light that we can discuss his novel in relation to British aestheticism. In her essay “Beauty’s Body: Gender Ideology and British Aestheticism,” Kathy Psomiades writes,

Aestheticism can sustain itself for so long in Britain because of the way in which it makes its own institutional nature its content: through iconic images of femininity. What is important here is not only that femininity, because of the development of middle-class gender ideology, can signify apartness from the praxis of everyday life (and thus apoliticality), but more significantly that femininity allows for the coincidence of institution and content without provoking “the self-criticism of art.” Because of the intricate structure of mid-Victorian gender ideology, iconic images of femininity not only figure or represent the “social ineffectuality” of art in bourgeois culture, but also disavow or cover over this ineffectuality and its consequences.

Thackeray, we might theorize, was able “to get away with” his satire by imaging it in terms of a marginalized feminine space that belied—thanks to a tacit cultural agreement as to the apoliticality of the feminine—its own status as political discourse, a discourse that must be hidden anyway in order to conceal its rhetorical emptiness. It is precisely this “feminizing” of satire that allows Thackeray to cover his tracks and sustain the ideology of knowing and not knowing which, as Psomiades shows, is the very linchpin of British aeshtheticism.

That VANITY FAIR is, thematically speaking, a novel about women, I take to be a universal truth. By his own admission Thackeray has abandoned the traditional masculinist historical novel; in so doing, he has written a new kind of historical novel in which, as we suggested above, the political is by and large subsumed into a discursive yet ultimately harmless (because biologically and socially invisible) feminine space.

The real war, in other words, within the self-contradictory perspective of the novel, is fought between its opposing conceptions of femininity as embodied in Becky and Amelia, respectively: between a subversive feminine identity that dangerously and visibly encroaches on the male sphere of power and domination, on the one hand, and a quietly submissive, tractable, hidden, “English” femininity on the other. The outcome of this contemporary battle, it need hardly be noted, is just as much a foregone conclusion as that of Waterloo some decades earlier. Becky is routed and sent packing back to France where she belongs; Amelia triumphs in her saccharine marriage to the good English officer. The more things change, the more they remain the same.

Why is Becky, clearly the character with whom Thackeray most closely identifies, so cruelly punished? We observed that she encroaches on masculine power. She does this by consistently—until the very end—beating men at their own game, using them to her ends instead of the other way around. That much is obvious. It should be remarked, however, that Becky, “the little mimic,” also steps over the line by playing the artist on center stage.

Becky consistently employs stereotypes to her own advantage very much like a satirist. She writes novelistic letters complete with dialogue and commentary. She exhibits a kind of pragmatic Bovaryism: being nothing, she must create something for herself out of that nothingness—like the novelist creating believable fiction and getting paid for it. And she very nearly succeeds in transforming reality by her effort of will. But like Emma Bovary, whom Charles Baudelaire for one interpreted as a failed romantic artist, and about whom Flaubert purportedly remarked, “Madame Bovary, c’est Moi!”—I say, much like Emma’s, Becky’s dreams are finally dashed. In both characters, the figurative artist is simultaneously feminized and punished, empowered only to be rendered impotent in the final analysis.

Consistent with its internal (il)logic of contradictions, which we have traced through both formal and thematic levels, VANITY FAIR succeeds in effacing the role of the artist, who is relegated to a powerless (because voiceless) feminine position. We might even go so far as to interpret the American novel around 1848 in this light. In conceiving Pearl by herself, as it were, metaphorically an extremely radical act, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Hester Prynne in THE SCARLET LETTER might be thought of as an artist figure who has become dangerous to the community’s code of feminine silence and who must therefore be punished. Might the scarlet letter, then, around 1848, in America as well as Europe, stand for Art? 

Copyright (c) 2010 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

A Brief Survey of Transgression in the Theory of the Novel

Sol Luckman

Transgression is a term for which, it would seem, every theorist of the novel has a different definition. For Georg Lukács, transgression obtains specifically in those modern novels possessed of a nihilistic outlook which, by hook or crook, deny history. Formalists such as Viktor Shklovsky like to talk about stylistic transgression in the novel, which, according to them, evolves independently of history through a constant, transgressive rewriting of former texts. In Roland Barthes’s model (in which there are two competing types of transgression), sexual identity and transgression are dialectically entwined.

We can thus easily identify at least three categories of transgression in the theory of the novel, which I will call, somewhat reductively, the political, the stylistic, and the sexual (which subsumes gender). As we will see, these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but combining them can be a tricky business. In addition to the three theorists mentioned above, I will limit my discussion to the influential models of Ian Watt, Mikhail Bakhtin, and D.A. Miller. It goes without saying that such a sampling of theorists merely scratches the surface of an extremely complicated field, and I must here apologize for my own transgression against academic thoroughness.

For Lukács—on this issue perhaps alone among leading theorists of the novel—transgression is defined negatively. Lukács’s Gustave Flaubert and Emile Zola, as described in THE HISTORICAL NOVEL, are precursors and abettors of modern(ist) decadence, guilty, like so many Twentieth Century historians, of transgressing against history itself. This historical transgression takes the form of “modernization,” based in the “belief that the fundamental structure of the past is economically and ideologically the same as that of the present.”

Modern writers are not just blind to historicity (their own included), however; according to Lukács, they also needlessly vilify the present. Specifically, in the novels of Flaubert “those brutal and animal features are emphasized and placed at the centre, which occur later in Zola as characteristics of the life of modern workers and peasants. Thus Flaubert’s portrayal is ‘prophetic’. Not however, in the sense in which Balzac’s works were prophetic, anticipating the actual, future development of social types, but merely in a literary-historical sense, anticipating the later distortion of modern life in the works of the Naturalists.”

Lukács places great emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual in history (individualized collectivity) as well as on the uniqueness of the historical moment (historical materialism). To transgress against this uniqueness is the highest literary crime and merits Lukács’s reactionary wrath, as witnessed above. Transgression is further bluntly defined in Lukács’s model as inhuman: “Flaubert has against his will become the initiator of the inhuman in modern literature.” (Note that transgression is not necessarily a matter of will, but can inhere in a text despite the intentions of the writer, a line of thinking which runs, curiously, through Barthes.) Transgression operates equally at the level of style: “The Flaubertian attitude towards history inevitably leads to a disintegration of epic language” by inducing writers to approximate historicity through a misleading “pseudo-historical language form.”

Finally, given that the (true) novel is defined as an accurate portrayal of the individual (once again, collectively defined) within a specific historical moment, Lukács views the tendency to psychologize—so prevalent in modernism—merely as a transgressive aberration. The “tendency to make history private is a general characteristic of the nascent decline of great realism,” he proclaims. To summarize, we might say that, in Lukács’s theory of the novel, transgression is everything that is not realism.
    
In Shklovskean formalism, as in his THEORY OF PROSE, art is defined as that which transgresses against (disrupts) the unconscious: “The purpose of art ... is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ of sight instead of recognition. By ‘enstranging’ objects and complicating form, the device of art makes perception long and ‘laborious.’ The perceptual process in art has a purpose all its own and ought to be extended to the fullest. Art is a means of experiencing the process of creativity.”

Here transgression is (positively) defined as an essential characteristic of the novel, as that which allows its always already old story to be made new. The novel, then, is like the phoenix forever being reborn out of its ashes, forever essentially the same, only plumed with new feathers: “a work of art is perceived against a background of and by association with other works of art. The form of a work of art is determined by its relationship with other preexisting forms ... All works of art, and not only parodies, are created either as a parallel or an antithesis to some model. The new form makes its appearance not in order to express a new content, but rather, to replace an old form that has already outlived its artistic usefulness.”

Clearly, Shklovsky’s theory opposes the Romantic (and for that matter, Lukácsean) view of the “natural” (or “realistic”) novel. Stated another way, the natural in Shklovsky’s model—if it exists at all—is purely a question of form, which is said to be in constant (transgressive) flux, rendering the “natural” paradoxically transgressive. Thus artistic formalism is intimately tied to the notion of the avant-garde: the novel is inherently generationally transgressive owing to its ongoing need to make itself new.

Unlike Pierre Bourdieu’s focus on the avant-garde, however, Shklovsky’s theory does not concern itself with economic or other “outside” determining factors of cultural production; rather, the latter’s model operates entirely on the “inside,” offering a view of literature as a closed history of texts in reaction/response to other texts. “If I were to use the analogy of an inventor and his tradition,” writes Shklovsky (using said analogy), “I would say that ... literary tradition consists of the sum total of the technical possibilities of [the given] age.”

Strangely, the ostensibly antagonistic theories of Shklovsky and Lukács, after traveling for so long in opposite directions, ultimately approach each other in their mutual disdain for psychologizing and emphasis on the collective nature of art. “There is no point in becoming enamored of the biography of an artist,” writes Shklovsky. “He writes first and looks for motivations later. And least of all should one be enamored of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis studies the psychological traumas of one person, while in truth, an author never writes alone. A school of writers writes through him. A whole age.”

The notion that transgression is constitutive of the novel itself is most evident in the example of Laurence Sterne, author of TRISTRAM SHANDY and arguably Shklovsky’s prototype of the novelist: “Sterne lays bare the device by which he stitches the novel out of individual stories. He does so, in general, by manipulating the structure of his novel, and it is the consciousness of form through its violation that constitutes the content of the novel.”

Sterne’s transgressiveness thus lies in his turning of novelistic tradition mercilessly on its head, in his subversion, or inversion, of the accepted forms of novelistic genre and style. In Shklovsky’s model, the novel as object, however, as “pure form,” merely a “relationship of materials,” is finally not transgressive in the least. Art is ultimately “inoffensive,” “shut up within itself.” Once rendered material, in other words, the novel ceases to be transgressive—the (formal) rendering is itself the transgressive act.
    
In THE RISE OF THE NOVEL Ian Watt defines the novel, as a “novel” form, as that which breaks definitively with the traditional, rigid hierarchy of genres: “literary traditionalism was first and most fully challenged by the novel, whose primary criterion was truth to individual experience—individual experience which is always unique and therefore new.” At the same time, Watt maintains that this break with the past has its roots in Cartesian thinking, which sets the new individual tone for the post-Renaissance. In an attempt to account for mediation, to locate the origins of the novel both on the “outside” and the “inside” (to fuse Lukács and Shklovsky, so to speak), Watt defines the novel as doubly (ideologically and formally) transgressive against the old (collective, rigidly hierarchical) social and artistic order.

For Watt, novelistic formalism translates into “formlessness,” which (whether by dint of “genius” or “accident” it remains unclear) translates into “the lowest common denominator of the novel genre as a whole, its formal realism”: “What is often felt as the formlessness of the novel, as compared, say, with tragedy or the ode, probably follows from this: the poverty of the novel’s formal conventions would seem to be the price it must pay for realism.” And this realism, in the novels of Daniel Defoe, for example, “is as defiant an assertion of the primacy of individual experience ... as Descarte’s cogito ergo sum  was in philosophy.” For Watt, then, like Shklovsky and unlike Lukács, the art of the novel is first and foremost an art of transgression.

According to Watt, there is a very important temporal transgression at work in the novel, which “[breaks] with the earlier literary tradition of using timeless stories to mirror the unchanging moral verities. The novel’s plot is also distinguished from most previous fiction by its use of past experience as the cause of present action: a causal connection operating through time replaces a reliance of earlier narratives on disguises and coincidences, and this tends to give the novel a much more cohesive structure.” With the new conception of time comes a new conception of space: “Defoe would seem to be the first of our writers who visualised the whole of his narrative as though it occurred in an actual physical environment.”

Behind these (transgressive) changes in philosophy and literature lies something all-determining for Watt—the emergence of a large (relatively speaking) middle class reading public during the Eighteenth Century: “both the philosophical and the literary innovations must be seen as parallel manifestations of larger change—that vast transformation of Western civilisation since the Renaissance which has replaced the unified world picture of the Middle Ages with another very different one—one which presents us, essentially, with a developing but unplanned aggregate of particular individuals having particular experiences at particular times and at particular places.”

Here Watt’s model insists on a kind of precise historical materialism not unlike that found in Lukács’s theory, and yet Watt, by emphasizing a cultural rift as decisive in the formation of the novel, cannot escape the language of transgression: the transgression effected in and constituted by the novel reflects a vast cultural transgression that undergirds and surrounds it.

Watt’s theory of mediation has its share of inconsistencies. “Formal realism is only one mode of presentation,” he writes, “and it is therefore ethically neutral: all Defoe’s novels are also ethically neutral because they make formal realism an end rather than a means, subordinating any coherent ulterior significance to the illusion that the text represents the authentic lucubrations of an historical person.” Watt’s previous language of cultural transgression has without warning become a language of the social status quo smelling of Shklovskean formalism, a tendency which is even more pronounced when he focuses on the novels of Samuel Richardson: “The importance of Richardson’s position in the tradition of the novel was largely due to his success in dealing with several of the major formal problems which Defoe had left unsolved” (italics mine).

The next step on Watt’s form/ideology roller coaster, however, brings us back to Lukács: the novel typically “makes us feel that we are in contact not with literature but with the raw materials of life itself as they are momentarily reflected in the minds of the protagonists.” Watt goes on to attempt a synthesis of form and ideology which appears naïve at best, condescending at worst: the “combination of romance and formal realism applied both to external actions and inward feelings is the formula which explains the power of the popular novel: it satisfies the romantic aspirations of its readers in a literary guide which gives so full a background and so complete an account of the minute-by-minute details of thought and sentiment that what is fundamentally an unreal flattery of the reader’s dreams appears to be the literal truth.” Thus the reader, that defining figure in Watt’s model, remains little more than a shadow made to dance by the still more abstract concept of “literary greatness.”

The cracks in Watt’s theory are perhaps most pronounced in his treatment of Henry Fielding’s novels, whose “distinguishing elements have their roots not so much in social change as in the neo-classical literary tradition ... Fielding’s celebrated formula of ‘the comic epic in prose’ undoubtedly lends some authority to the view that, far from being the unique literary expression of modern society, the novel is essentially a continuation of a very old and honoured narrative tradition.” The possibility of a venerable novelistic tradition, however, Watt firmly denies by locating the source of Sterne and James Joyce (as well as that of Jane Austen and Marcel Proust) not in Fielding’s playful picaresque (in the tradition of Miguel de Cervantes), as one might reasonably expect, but in the formal realism of Defoe and Richardsona shaky argument at best. So ends in a muddle a model with high hopes for reconciling the formal and ideological poles in the theory of the novel.

In Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogical theory espoused in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, the novel looms forth out of history as the ultimate transgressor, Gargantua consuming (appropriating wholesale) all other genres into its heteroclite body from the dawn of culture onward: “The novel parodies other genres (precisely in their role as genres); it exposes the conventionality of their forms and their language; it squeezes out some genres and incorporates others into its own peculiar structure, reformulating and re-accentuating them.”

Unlike Watt, Bakhtin makes no effort to identify a precise period for the rise of the novel (though he does cite the Renaissance, and particularly François Rabelais, as an important moment in the novel’s history), choosing instead to trace the evolution of the novelistic as a quality that ceaselessly forms and informs the novel genre. Yet, like Watt, Bakhtin stresses both the formal and ideological influences in the novel’s development: “It is of course impossible to explain the phenomenon of novelization purely by reference to the direct and unmediated influence of the novel itself. Even where such influence can be precisely established and demonstrated, it is intimately interwoven with those direct changes in reality itself that also determine the novel and that condition its dominance in a given era.”

Bakhtin defines the novelistic as against the epic. The novelistic (once again, the novel is appropriately “novel”) is that which breaks down (transgresses against) epic’s “absolute past” by admitting the reality of the present. Specifically, this transgression obtains through humor: “It is precisely laughter that destroys the epic, and in general destroys any hierarchical (distancing and valorized) distance.”

In other words, the reading subject, by actively decoding and approving a transgressive message (a message which travels through a semantic static of words in time and space) plays an essential role in the creation of the novel: “the reality reflected in the text, the authors creating the text, the performers of the text (if they exist) and finally the listeners or readers who re-create and in so doing renew the text—participate equally in the creation of the represented world in the text.”

Bakhtin thus adds a critical third element to the formalist/historicist equation—the reader as (actively transgressive) participant in the formation of the novel—thereby calling attention to the complex interplay of textual production. At the same time, his focus on the living word, the word made incarnate in a great transgressive body, is suggestive of the body politic, and from there it is but a small leap to arrive at the concept of a revolution of bodies effected through the word.

Following Bakhtin’s lead, Roland Barthes in S/Z wastes no time locating narrative transgression (for classic texts) in the figure of the narrator. The narrator, as a “joining of two antithetical terms,” positive and negative, inside and outside, “induces or supports a transgression.” Moreover, it is precisely the narrative body which is viewed as the transgressive element: “As supplement, the body is the site of the transgression effected by the narrative ... It is by way of this excess which enters the discourse after rhetoric has properly saturated it that something can be told and the narrative begin.”

For the classic, or readerly text, transgression is closely associated with the (bodily) presence of the author, with his/her intrusion into the world of the text which simultaneously effects the narrative and yet limits its free semantic play, thereby restricting our freedom as (re)readers (re)writing the text. Unlike Bakhtin, who stops just short of (approvingly) defining the novel as parody, a genre composed entirely of ironic appropriations by the author, Barthes maintains that irony destroys textual multivalence: “A multivalent text can carry out its basic duplicity only if it subverts the opposition between true and false ... if it flouts all respect for origin, paternity, propriety.”

Barthes argues that the readerly text must therefore by replaced by the writerly text, a move with definite implications for the politics of the body. Accordingly, the transgressive bodily intrusion of the readerly text (exemplified by Honoré de Balzac’s SARRASINE) must give way to another type of transgression: the infinitely plural, authorless, writerly text (anticipated, if not exemplified, by Gustave Flaubert’s BOUVARD ET PECUCHET): “multivalence (contradicted by irony) is a transgression of ownership. The wall of voices must be passed through to reach the writing: this latter eschews any designation of ownership and thus can never be ironic ... parody, or irony at work, is always classic language ... This is the problem facing modern writing: how breach the wall of utterance, the wall of origin, the wall of ownership?”

Thus, to the opposition between readerly and writerly corresponds an opposition between two types of transgression, the former negative, the latter positive, which, Barthes suggests, are currently locked in a struggle for hegemony not unlike the figure of antithesis, defined as a “battle between two plenitudes set ritually face to face.” To read this as simply a conflict between capitalist individualism and collectivist modes of thinking is, I offer, an oversimplification. The political stakes, however, would appear to be high and undoubtedly center on questions of sexual (bodily) freedom. Indeed, Barthes’s model could be thought of as a call to arms of the sexually transgressive which would undermine (or redefine) accepted, “canonical” notions of reading gender and sexuality, paving the way for the later transgressive model of D.A. Miller.

In THE NOVEL AND THE POLICE Miller structures his theory of the novel around Michel Foucault’s theory of discipline. Whereas Foucault focuses on increasing objectification and classification of individuals during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Miller examines discipline at work in the Nineteenth Century (realistic) novel, which he maintains institutes a panoptic (as in Jeremy Benthams infamous panopticon prison) transgression against individual privacy concomitant with the increasingly panoptic social ground.

In the typical case of Balzac, for instance, Miller writes that his “omniscient narration assumes a fully panoptic view of the world it places under surveillance.” Unlike Barthes, however, Miller is careful not to identify such narrative transgression with a single body, a move which shifts the focus from transgressor to transgressed against, from writer to reader: “this panoptic vision constitutes its own immunity from being seen in turn. For it instrinsically deprives us of the outside position from which it might be ‘placed.’ There is no other perspective on the world than its own, because the world entirely coincides with that perspective. We are always situated inside the narrator’s viewpoint, and even to speak of a ‘narrator’ at all is to misunderstand a technique that, never identified with a person, institutes a faceless and multilateral regard.”

It is hardly coincidental that, while Barthes chooses a first person narrative to make his point, Miller generally selects texts in the third person. In both cases, however, the narrative is conceived as a limited and limiting perspective which seeks to give itself the illusion of totality. The realistic novel thus effects a kind of underhanded power play which corresponds not only to Barthes’s “reality effect” but also to Bakhtin’s notion of “monologism.” “The panopticism of the novel,” writes Miller, “… coincides with what Mikhail Bakhtin has called its ‘monologism’: the working of an implied master-voice whose accents have already unified the world in a single interpretative center.” The realistic novel, in other words, constituting itself as the always already, the definitive one and only perspective, attempts to answer all questions before they have been asked.

Miller deftly avoids the good guy/bad guy binary he sees at work in realism’s taxonomy by not simply problematizing the panoptic text. In an important move, he points out the reader’s own complicity in the exercise of transgression against himself, writing, “power can scarcely be exercised except on what resists it ... one might claim that the novel rather than fearing desire solicits it ... desire brings the desiring subject into a maximally close ‘fit’ with the power he or she means to resist ... Insistently, the novel shows disciplinary power to inhere in the very resistance to it.” The “pleasure of the text,” according to Miller, is intimately tied to a desire on the part of the reading subject to be exposed (as an individual).

Anticipating Eve Sedgwick, Miller builds his closet out of glass: “Even when a character’s subjectivity may be successfully concealed from other characters, for us, readers of the novel, the secret is always out.” And yet: “the fact the secret is always known—and, in some obscure sense, known to be known—never interferes with the incessant activity of keeping it. The contradiction does not merely affect characters. We too inevitably surrender our privileged position as readers to whom all secrets are open by ‘forgetting’ our knowledge for the pleasures of suspense and surprise ... In this light, it becomes clear that the social function of secrecy ... is not to conceal knowledge, so much as to conceal the knowledge of the knowledge.”

In the final analysis, secrecy, rather than constituting the subject’s private identity, affords a term of resistance which allows the panopticon to cast its transgressive gaze while at the same time paradoxically affirming its blindness: “In a world where the explicit exposure of the subject would manifest how thoroughly he has been inscribed within a socially given totality, secrecy would be the spiritual exercise by which the subject is allowed to conceive of himself as a resistance ... The paradox of the open secret registers the subject’s accommodation to a totalizing system that has obliterated the difference he would make.”

The pleasure of the text is not finally different from a kind of condescending pity which, through a process of self-reflection, renders us, to a greater or lesser extent, “free”: “The charm we allow to Dickens’s characters ... is ultimately no more than the debt of gratitude we pay to their fixity for giving us, in contrast, our freedom.” Such freedom, however, as Miller suggests, is purely relative. In the world of the panopticon violation is the rule rather than the exception.

My search for the meaning of transgression in six theories of the novel has, I am afraid, produced far more questions than answers. Following, then, is my conclusion in which nothing is concluded:

• Why does it seem obligatory to define the novel, either negatively or positively, vis-à-vis transgression? Is transgression in fact the art of the novel? If we could answer these questions, we would be much closer to explaining both what a novel is (form) and what a novel does (ideology).

• The novel, as a transgressive genre, is almost always associated with movement, change. Yet it is often difficult to pinpoint exactly where and when this change occurs, not to mention how and why. Is the novel a transgressive act or does it induce one? In other words, what is the relationship between transgression and culture? Is transgression truly transgressive, or is it, as Jonathan Dollimore maintains, “intrinsic to social process”?

• On a similar note, what is the relationship between transgression and subversion in the novel? To what degree is novelistic transgression subversive and vice versa? In Miller’s theory, for instance, transgression serves to maintain, rather than subvert, the social status quo. But Bakhtin suggests that the novel, as a transgressive genre, is somehow revolutionary. Are these views entirely incompatible, or might the novel be both? Barthes implies that it is indeed both, but his model for mediation is practically nonexistent. What might a theory look like that could mediate successfully between the transgressive and the (non)transgressive in the novel?

Copyright (c) 2010 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

Hemingway's Experimental Math: THE GARDEN OF EDEN

Sol Luckman

Readers familiar with Ernest Hemingway’s fiction tend to be surprised and vaguely ill-at-ease when entering the lush textual vegetation of his posthumously published novel THE GARDEN OF EDEN. Begun in 1946 and left unfinished at the time of the author’s death in 1961, THE GARDEN OF EDEN has generated a healthy amount of scholarly debate since its sensational appearance in 1986. Bristling with a new challenge, critics have been drawn primarily to two topics that the text itself foregrounds: the gender-bending theme linking the young writer-protagonist David Bourne to his new wife Catherine in an incestuous love-hate relationship; and the formal characteristics of this oddly “postmodernist” novel which combines Hemingway’s signature realism with intense metafictional experimentation worthy of Italo Calvino or John Barth.

This is not to suggest, as some critics have done, that THE GARDEN OF EDEN represents a radically unprecedented departure from the standard Hemingway novel we all know and love. Gender-bending, particularly under its outward sign of the “crossing” haircut, threads conspicuously through THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926), A FAREWELL TO ARMS (1929) and FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS (1940), before reaching a kind of apotheosis in THE GARDEN OF EDEN.

As for metafiction, one need look no further than to the most anthologized of Hemingway’s stories, “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (1936), to trouble our accepted notions of Hemingway as the past century’s arch-realist. In fact, the principal metafictional technique employed in THE GARDEN OF EDEN with such bewildering effect was already fully integrated into “The Snows of Kilimanjaro.” In both texts we find framed within the basetext a summarized meta-narrative which takes place inside the creative subject’s consciousness: just as we experience David writing his African stories, and at the same time somehow “read” the stories themselves, we follow Harry, who is dying of gangrene in Tanzania, through a series of “unwritten” narratives that he imagines in his delusion. And in both novel and story the dialogue between basetext and metatext is productive of meanings that a purely “linear” narrative would be hard-pressed to convey.

Reception of THE GARDEN OF EDEN has been spotty at best, with most reviewers agreeing that the novel as published by Scribners (following a controversial editing out of approximately a thousand pages of manuscript) ultimately fails to deliver the goods as a complete work of art. I disagree with this rather cavalier assessment, but as Kant warned us long ago, we have no business arguing tastes to begin with.

What interests me in this novel, editorially sanitized though it may be, is the leap Hemingway takes into a sustained (if not altogether new) dialogized universe in which a wide range of binarisms are collapsed and then all mixed up together like the bouillabaisse his characters so decadently consume. THE GARDEN OF EDEN, as its name implies, is a world apart, a textual universe where traditional distinctions—as between masculine and feminine, self and other, life and art—hold no sway, where straight lines become circular and end where they began, where the comfortable logic of either/or is replaced by the disconcerting possibility of both/and. Nowhere is this perplexing illogic more evident than in David and Catherine’s bizarre sex life, whose lack of description in the novel has, according to Comley and Scholes, led “one befuddled critic to suggest that ‘somehow, she sodomizes him.’”

Thankfully, reviewers agree that Hemingway, whether or not his tackle was sufficient to the task at hand, was after bigger fish than many have given him credit for. “Nowhere else in Hemingway’s work is the intricate relationship between reality and imagination, between self and art, so originally explored,” writes Allen Josephs, adding, “If William Faulkner had read [this] book, I doubt he would have remarked on Hemingway’s lack of ‘courage to get out on a limb of experimentation.’” Hemingway himself was clearly aware of the tangled, nonlinear implications of his novel, as well as of the problems of interpretation it might pose, for he was fond of pointing out to critics during the period he was composing THE GARDEN OF EDEN, “Gentlemen, you are criticizing my arithmetic when I am long ago into calculus.”

As this quip suggests, and as criticism has abundantly borne out, the tendency to read THE GARDEN OF EDEN as a symbolic algorithm—whether step-by-step back into the author’s biography, or more problematic still, as a self-evident example of the author’s famous “hero code”—has been strong. Nowhere has this tendency to pigeonhole the novel been more patent than in the readings given to David and Catherine Bourne. It has generally been acknowledged that both characters are, despite Hemingway’s cited distaste for “composite characters,” among the most synthetic creations in recent literature.

As a rather scantily disguised rewriting of F. Scott Fitzgerald’ TENDER IS THE NIGHT, a subject to which I will return, THE GARDEN OF EDEN positions David and Catherine as surrogates for, respectively, Scott/Dick Diver/Gerald Murphy and Zelda/Nicole Diver/Sara Murphy. At the same time David is clearly a projection of Hemingway, similar in a myriad of respects to the narrator of A MOVEABLE FEAST, just as Catherine represents, variously, at least three of the author’s wives. To complicate matters further, Marita, the “dark girl” brought in by Catherine to be her “Heiress” when she leaves, suggestively recalls two of these same wives, Pauline Pfeiffer and Mary Welsh, both of whom were bisexual and entered Hemingway’s life as the third term in adulterous love triangles which prefigure THE GARDEN OF EDEN.

Where critics have typically struggled has been in the interpretation of David and Catherine, a process which has often resulted in an elaborate form of choosing sides between the two. According to this either/or logic—which the text itself resolutely seeks to deconstruct—the novel must have a protagonist and an antagonist, a good guy and a bad guy (or a good guy and a bad gal, or vice versa).

The traditional approach, followed by Josephs, for example, is to read David as the hero and Catherine as the transgressive she-devil who, to culminate her long list of sins against the artist-hero, burns David’s African stories, an act which Josephs calls “one of the most shattering acts of cruelty anywhere in Hemingway’s fiction.” At the opposite end of the critical spectrum, Steven C. Roe, basing his study (“Opening Bluebeard’s Closet”) on the manuscript, has taken it upon himself to thoroughly demonize David as a monstrously egomaniacal Bluebeard figure who sacrifices his wives to his art and represents what Hemingway “feared most about himself.”

Hemingway does at times make David out to be a Bluebeardesque “monster,” even in the expurgated published version, as Catherine at one points makes explicit. Nevertheless, although Roe admits that “Catherine, to a lesser degree, becomes ‘monstrous’ herself,” his reading of the novel—in addition to ignoring the evidence that David represents to some extent a critical parody of Fitzgerald—tends to polarize David and Catherine in a way I’m arguing against in this essay.

Attempting to establish a middle ground between these extreme interpretations, Kathy Willingham, in “Hemingway’s THE GARDEN OF EDEN: Writing with the Body,” has argued for a feminist reading of Catherine which would place her alongside David as the text’s “other” artist. “GARDEN unequivocally constitutes a unique and moreover, dual, Künstlerroman,” she writes.

That it traces the development of David’s artistic life is an idea which most critics enthusiastically embrace. However, GARDEN also portrays Catherine’s artistic odyssey, and this becomes evident by analyzing the components of the novel which Hemingway suppresses. By submerging Catherine’s artistic quest beneath aspects of the narrative foregrounding David’s development, Hemingway mirrors a central thematic concern, namely the suppression of female creativity. To focus only on David’s narrative and point of view not only neglects Catherine’s artistic evolution, but constitutes a failure to acknowledge the text’s “Other” where free play and creativity exist.

Willingham persuasively demonstrates how Catherine subverts David’s “patriarchal” moratorium on her creativity by not only scripting the novel which David in effect transcribes, but also by creating her own text using her body as prima materia. Recognition of Catherine’s status as (oppressed) writer is vital to a healthy understanding of THE GARDEN OF EDEN. Nancy Comley and Robert Scholes, whose rereading of Hemingway’s novel focuses precisely on those moments of ambiguity where “normative” notions of gender and identity are elided, unfortunately tend to overpsycholanalyze the author, interpreting Catherine less as an artist-figure than as “the puritanical castrating mother who destroys her boy-man’s connection to the primitive.”

Similarly, Willingham’s strict essentializing of the feminine and the masculine, her insistence on reading Catherine solely in terms of David’s “Other,” runs the risk of once again forcing a choice between the two as creative (or for that matter, destructive) models. But the text repeatedly stresses the paradox that David and Catherine not only represent opposing versions of the artist, locked in war-like struggle, but that they also are the same artist.

“Why do we have to go by everyone else’s rules?” Catherine asks David early in the novel. “We’re us.” “Maybe I’d better go back into our world,” she tells him a bit later, “your and my world that I made up; we made up I mean.” Finally, toward the end of the novel, we read from David’s perspective: “Catherine was not his enemy except as she was himself in the unfinding unrealizable quest that is love and so was her own  enemy ... She turns my flank so skillfully then finds it is her own and the last fighting is always in a swirl and the dust that rises is our own dust” (emphasis mine; Faulkneresque verbiage Hemingway’s).

Sporting identical haircuts and suntans, sharing the same lover, swapping sexual roles back and forth, both ravenously hungry and fearful of time, David and Catherine’s individual boundaries are blurred over and over again in THE GARDEN OF EDEN. Mark Spilka makes a strong case for reading these characters in virtually Jungian terms, as simultaneously animus and anima of the author’s androgynous creative psyche. Although such psychological readings usually give me goosebumps, there’s a lot to chew on in Spilka’s model—not because it provides a vision of some kind of transcendental “truth,” but because Hemingway himself obviously thought in these “mirroring” terms.

Viewed from this perspective, Catherine’s mention of “the world we made up” shouldn’t be taken lightly: THE GARDEN OF EDEN is very much a dual creation, a product of the literal and figurative marriage between David, who transcribes the travel narrative that makes up the novel, and Catherine, who directs the narrative’s plot and stars in its pages. The novel which ends with David and Catherine’s impending divorce paradoxically represents their most complete union—if not the child they were unable to have—thus concluding on a thematic level a logic-defying loop which in every way parallels the type of illogic inherent in the self-begetting text.

I will return to the relationship between form and content in THE GARDEN OF EDEN, but first I would like briefly to address the notion of the Garden evoked in the title. In 1948, after finishing the greater part of a first draft, Hemingway remarked to a friend that the novel was about “the happiness of the Garden that a man must lose.” This statement has tempted more than one critic into the problematic assumption that there’s a garden in this text to begin with, one which is lost over the course of the narrative to be replaced by the bitter fruit of wisdom. “Rather than a coincidentia oppositorum or the homo totus of Jungian psychology, which are metaphors for fulfillment and integration,” writes Josephs, “David and Catherine’s experiments expose the disintegration that comes with the loss of the garden and the curse of human sexuality. It is no coincidence that David comes to call her Devil.”

While admitting this to be one possible interpretation of the Garden as a symbol, with such a contradictory, polyvalent narrative we should always be wary of oversimplifying. Another way of reading the Garden, and one I think is suggested by the very possibility of a reading like the one sketched above in this novel structured on the mirror image, is its exact opposite: that there is no foundational Garden in this text. The hunger pangs that lead David and Catherine into the moral wilderness of androgyny, instead of suddenly disrupting paradise, are, as the first chapter makes abundantly clear, present as evil seeds from the beginning.

In this interpretation David, who shares Catherine’s hunger, is as much a Satan/Eve figure as Catherine herself—yet again inviting us to consider the two as a single character. Speaking to himself in the mirror following his first haircut and bleaching with Catherine, David says, “All right. You like it ... Now go through with the rest of it whatever it is and don’t ever say anyone tempted you or that anyone bitched you.” Perhaps we hear an echo in this passage of Hemingway’s letter to Fitzgerald in which he criticized TENDER IS THE NIGHT: “We’re all bitched from the start.” In any case it doesn’t require much imagination to see how David and Catherine are indeed bitched from the start.

Consistent with the project of rewriting Fitzgerald’s novel, Hemingway subtly implies that Catherine, like Nicole/Zelda, has spent time in a Swiss psychiatric hospital; David’s past is similarly traumatic, as his African stories leave little room to doubt. I’m suggesting that David and Catherine enter the world of THE GARDEN OF EDEN already in a state of fragmentation, and that the only integration or fulfillment in this text—belated though it may be—results from the fulfillment of the narrative premise itself: the only garden in this novel, in other words, is THE GARDEN OF EDEN.

From this perspective it might be helpful to interpret Marita not simply as a submissive nurse figure, as most critics have done, but also as the textual embodiment of the dark, shadowy (because unseen) Reader au sens large of the David/Catherine text. After all, Marita spends the majority of her spare time (if we can use the phrase for the idle rich) reading what David has written and Catherine scripted.

If this sounds like an example of overzealous criticism, perhaps it is. One thing is certain: THE GARDEN OF EDEN, by consciously and conspicuously foregrounding its formal characteristics, seems almost to require us to interpret its thematic content in formal or artistic terms. The opposite is equally true: the novel’s formal structuration lends itself easily to a reflexive meditation on its own content.

We see this reciprocal process at work most plainly in the relationship between gender economies and genre. Just as the plot dynamics hinge on the interplay between the masculine and the feminine, on a generic level the novel assumes the form of a complex dialogue between mimetic and metafictional modes. Moreover, in strikingly similar fashion to the blurring of gender and identity boundaries discussed above, the contours between the mimetic and the metafictional gradually run together until there’s no longer any distinguishing between the travel narrative and the African stories which enter that narrative in meta-form. The ultimate result of this mind- (and gender-) bending process is, of course, the self-begotten novel, in which basetext and metatext(s) are revealed as one and the same; but long before the final page mimesis and metafiction have ceased to exist as discrete categories. In Chapter Sixteen, for example, we find David at work on the second of his African stories:

But the half past ten was on the watch on his wrist as he looked at it in the room where he sat at a table feeling the breeze from the sea now and the real time was evening and he was sitting against the yellow gray base of a tree with a glass of whiskey and water in his hand and the rolled figs swept away watching the porters butchering out the Kongoni he had shot in the first grassy swale they passed before they came to the river.

This passage adds reality and fiction to the long list of binaries Hemingway throws out the window. Later, in conversation with Catherine, David is described as “[listening] in the unreality that reality had become.”

To return to the relationship between gender and genre, let us once again consider David and Catherine—this time, however, from a more strictly “literary” perspective. The point has been made that both characters, in their own manner, are writer-figures. In David’s case this is more self-evident than in Catherine’s, but the question remains: what kind of writers are they? Depending on whether we ask this question of the characters as they appear in the novel, or with respect to the novel as it is “written” by the character we’ve called David/Catherine, we get two very different answers.

In the first instance, David and Catherine represent contrasting conceptions of the artist. Despite the metafictional function which David’s African stories perform in the novel, it should be noted that the stories themselves, as related by Hemingway’s narrator, are essentially straightforward and mimetic, following a linear progression through a series of described events. Corresponding to David’s “realism” is its generic antithesis in the narcissistic body-text produced by Catherine: her masculine haircuts foreground for the viewer the fact that her “maleness” is merely the product of artifice, much as metafiction serves as a reminder that what we’re reading isn’t really “real.”

Catherine’s connection with metafiction comes tantalizingly close to being made explicit at least twice in the text. In Chapter Six she imagines herself in mise en abîme: “I was thinking so much about myself that I was getting impossible again, like a painter and I was my own picture.” Later, describing to David how she plans to have their hair cut, her terminology is suggestive of other meanings: “It’s sort of bevelled back from the natural line” (italics  mine).

We might even go so far as to read David’s African stories—which probe his past and culminate in “the beginning of the knowledge of loneliness”—as embodying the epistemological approach typically associated with a kind of modernism, whereas Catherine’s self-creating, cosmetic “fictions” would appear to have more in common with the ontological focus of postmodernist aesthetics. Without couching his argument precisely in these terms, Robert Jones hits upon the notion that THE GARDEN OF EDEN “constitutes an important link between Modernism and Post-Modernism.”

As co-creators of THE GARDEN OF EDEN, David/Catherine represents a third kind of writer, neither realist nor metafictionalist, but an androgynous synthesis of the two combining an awareness of epistemology with a fascination for ontology. By making the figure of androgyny thus resonate on both thematic and formal levels, Hemingway not only blurs the boundaries between masculine and feminine, self and other, art and life—he virtually collapses distinctions between content and form.

Even stylistics enters into play at this point: Hemingway’s trademark dialogue, which at first seems to be chiefly an aesthetic device, begins to take on added significance when we consider how dialogue functions as a trope for the interplay between the various binarisms we’ve been discussing. The role that mirrors play should be more closely examined as well. Throughout the novel mirroring serves as an appropriate metaphor for the paradoxical coexistence of sameness and difference, the virtual equivalence of reality and fiction, self and other, male and female, meta and mimetic, that make up the very quicksandy substance of THE GARDEN OF EDEN

The conflation of racial characteristics, as in the combination of dark skin and light hair, should also be considered in this context. According to Comley and Scholes, the Scribners text of the novel “does its author a serious disservice” by all but eliminating an important African subplot: “The obsession with tanning is connected with the desire to reach a primal level of experience, some heart of darkness, from which Euro-Americans have been cut off by their heritage of enlightenment.” This quest for “something powerfully irrational” is quite in keeping with the novel’s project of going beyond the limits imposed by Cartesian thinking.

There’s a case to be made that this “new” kind of novel—which Hemingway actually thought of at one point as forming a monumental tetralogy—should be read as the author’s treatise on the art of the novelist, especially when we compare David’s thoughts on writing with Hemingway’s own artistic theories. The most obvious similarity between character and author on the subject of aesthetics (there are many) is their shared “iceberg theory,” which gets translated by David into an image better suited to the equatorial climate he grew up in: “He wrote [the story] exactly and the sinister part only showed as the light feathering of a smooth swell on a calm day marking the reef beneath.”

On the other hand, there’s also a case to be made—and here we’re back to the absurd logic of both/and—that THE GARDEN OF EDEN betrays elements of self-parody in addition to its parody/critique of TENDER IS THE NIGHT. Concerning overt self-parody, we run into the problem of the manuscript versus the published novel. Josephs puts it euphemistically when he writes that “at times the book almost seems an anthology of Hemingway’s favorite topics and places.” It would be more to the point if he had asked, “Just how many martinis and Perrier whiskeys do the characters drink?” Is the novel intentionally self-parodic, or did Scribners and its editor intentionally find the “Hemingway novel” they went looking for in the manuscript?

That THE GARDEN OF EDEN represents a rewriting of Fitzgerald’s novel has been generally acknowledged by critics. Spilka, following Arthur Mizener’s insightful biography of Fitzgerald (THE FAR SIDE OF PARADISE), refers to TENDER IS THE NIGHT, along with Kipling’s JUNGLE BOOK, as among the novel’s “immediate sources,” on a par with its direct biographical inspiration: Ernest and Pauline’s honeymoon at Le Grau-du-Roi in 1927. Spilka traces Hemingway’s anxiety of influence to two specific scenes in Fitzgerald’s novel: the “barbershop showdown” where Tommy Barban confronts a half-shaven Dick Diver for Nicole’s hand, and the “lesbian lark” in which a vaguely repulsed Dick rescues his friend Mary North and Lady Caroline Sibley-Biers from jail after they have disguised themselves as sailors and picked up two unsuspecting girls. This seems as good a place as any to look for the original impetus for THE GARDEN OF EDEN, although as Spilka also points out, there’s more than enough documentation of transsexual haircuts, hair bleaching and lesbianism in Hemingway’s biography to account for his fascination with these subjects.

Obviously, many pieces of evidence support the claim that Hemingway was writing in response to TENDER IS THE NIGHT, not least of which is the fact that Hemingway was clearly obsessed by Fitzgerald’s novel, as he was by Fitzgerald himself. Their entangled relationship—based on admiration for each other’s work, a sense of competition out of proportion to the circumstances, and quite possibly repressed homosexual desire for one other—is reminiscent of the similar connection between Melville and Hawthorne a century earlier. If anything, Ernest and Scott’s “friendship” (I use the term loosely) has generated more myths, wholly or in part, than that of their nineteenth-century precursors, including such literary “myths” as Tennessee Williams’ CLOTHES FOR A SUMMER HOTEL, Kaye McDonough’s ZELDA and Hemingway’s own A MOVEABLE FEAST.

The barely submerged rewriting of the psychodrama between Scott and Zelda in THE GARDEN OF EDEN is one of the novel’s most salient features: a young writer’s career is threatened by his insane wife, whose jealousy of his writing, combined with his suppression of her creativity, pushes her to a series of vindictive acts against her husband, including tempting him to drink so that his writing will suffer. Bruccoli quotes Hemingway as telling Max Perkins shortly after the publication of TENDER IS THE NIGHT:

Scott can’t invent true characters because he doesn’t know anything about people ... he has so lousy much talent and he has suffered so without knowing why, has destroyed himself and destroyed Zelda, though never as much as she has tried to destroy him, that out of this little children’s, immature, misunderstood, whining for lost youth death-dance that they have been dragging into and out of insanity to the tune of, the guy all but makes a fine book, all but makes a splendid book.

Hemingway follows a similar narrative line in his depiction of Scott and Zelda’s relationship in A MOVEABLE FEAST. Specific references to Dick and Nicole of TENDER IS THE NIGHT abound in THE GARDEN OF EDEN, the most blatant of which being Diver David’s repeated plunges into the Mediterranean which resonate simultaneously on two very different levels. Depending on how we interpret David’s diving, it’s possible to read the novel in contradictory ways. Is diving here a metaphor for the artistic enterprise as it should be undertaken, a heroic probing of the depths of reality? or does it symbolize a narcissistic submersion in one’s own particular fantasy? In other words, is David the courageous artist-hero that some have claimed him to be, or is he an unsympathetic victim of Hemingway’s irony?

It should be clear by now that the answer to both these questions is yes. On the one hand, Spilka is surely accurate when he writes that Hemingway

correctly identified Fitzgerald’s “dangerous self-indulgence,” his importation of “feelings about his own decline” into the character of Dick Diver, as a problem Hemingway would himself have to face in his own version of the writer’s struggle with “tragic” circumstances. Thus, David Bourne, his chief persona in THE GARDEN OF EDEN, would make of the act of writing a stoic buffer against such circumstances and would stubbornly resist their debilitating power. He would confront the hazards of androgyny that Fitzgerald had only dimly understood ... and would overcome them through courageous masculine artistry.

According to this account, David/Ernest manages to triumph over “corrupting” feminine influence where Dick/Scott succumbs to an emotional and artistic “crack-up.”  But we also know that Hemingway doesn’t exactly pull his punches when it comes to David, who under the continual ironic blows of his author emerges with a black eye or two himself.

Parody isn’t a word one encounters much in Hemingway criticism, but it seems oddly appropriate in this novel. David’s complicity in his own “tragedy”—his blindness not only to Catherine’s personal and artistic needs, but to his own desires and needs as well, as paralleled by the story of his betrayal of the elephant—is a trenchant replaying of chapters out of both Fitzgerald’s and Hemingway’s lives. Thus by taking aim at Dick Diver—whose overestimation of his ability to “heal” Nicole is matched only by his underestimation of his emotional dependence on her—Hemingway writes a novel that defies attempts at categorization. Faced with an internally condradicted text which represents at once ars poetica, critique and self-aggrandizement, parody and self-parody, it’s hardly surprising that readers expecting a more or less “straightforward” story feel perplexed and giddy-headed when they turn the last page and replace the book on the shelf.

Fitzgerald once wrote that “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” In composing his most ambitious novel, Hemingway clearly took Fitzgerald at his word.

By collapsing a host of distinctions, from masculine and feminine to form and content to parody and self-parody, THE GARDEN OF EDEN moves beyond the limits of Cartesian logic into a complex, non-Euclidean universe where opposites attract and fuse together. The painful “change” that takes place with and between David and Catherine leaves them paradoxically more united in the aftermath of their separation—out of which THE GARDEN OF EDEN is “born”—than they ever were in the precarious balance of their “Edenic” honeymoon.

Nevertheless, the novel is far from ending on a happy note. We last hear from Catherine in a letter to David that sums up, poetically and lucidly, the madness that has driven her away and which threatens to recur at any moment. As for David, who finishes the novel by rewriting the African stories that Catherine has burned, it’s difficult not to see in his heroic “recovery” a relapse into the kind of self-obsessed, masturbatory blindness that led to Catherine’s exile from the garden in the first place. “Are we the Bournes?” Marita asks him shortly after Catherine has taken the train to Paris. The dialogue which follows her question speaks worlds to the attentive ear:

“Sure. We’re the Bournes. It may take a while to have the papers. But that’s what we are. Do you want me to write it out?  I think I could write that.”

“You don’t need to write it.”

“I’ll write it in the sand,” David said.

Consistent with its internal illogic, THE GARDEN OF EDEN ends in a sense exactly where it began, with David and Marita’s marriage—exactly like David and Catherine’s—ready to be washed away like writing in the sand. In the final analysis we are left to contemplate the dangerous isolation and selfishness inherent in the writerly enterprise. For David, who “[cares] about the writing more than about anything else,” remains sadly the same little Davey whom his father described as the “iron-hearted little bastard. He meant to say cold-hearted but he turned it kindly with his gently lying mouth. Or maybe he meant it.”

Copyright (c) 2010 by Sol Luckman. All Rights Reserved.

[Sol Luckman is a prolific visual artist and critically acclaimed author of fiction and nonfiction. His numerous books include the international bestselling CONSCIOUS HEALING: BOOK ONE ON THE REGENETICS METHOD and the newly released POTENTIATE YOUR DNA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HEALING AND TRANSFORMATION WITH THE REGENETICS METHOD. For information on the “revolutionary healing science” (NEXUS) of the Regenetics Method, check out http://www.PhoenixRegenetics.org. Sol is also author of the BEGINNER’S LUKE Series of seriocomic novels that hilariously explore the role of imagination in creating reality. A respected New York publisher, whose authors feature a National Book Award finalist and dozens of prestigious award winners, made an offer (declined in favor of self-publishing) for the six-volume BEGINNER’S LUKE Series, which was selected out of a “slush pile” of 8,000 manuscripts—a rare and wonderful feat. Luke’s signature obsessions with self, sex, satire and slapdash highlight a serious, and life-changing, point: CONSCIOUSNESS CREATES. The point is there is a point to living in the imagination—for only through it can we reinvent our ourselves and our world. Share the Adventure of an imaginary lifetime by visiting http://www.BeginnersLuke.com. View Sol’s paintings and learn more about his work at http://www.CrowRising.com.]

Tags